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Abstract
Relationships between trait dissociation, attention, sleep and mood were explored using
self-report surveys and neurocognitive assessments in undergraduate students. Individuals
scoring higher on the amnesia and derealization subscales of the Dissociative Experiences Scale
performed worse on selective and divided attention tasks. In general, individuals scoring higher
on total dissociation scored less well on attention tasks. Sleep experiences as measured by the
ISES were related to dissociation, but this relationship was not significant when controlling for
mood. Affect was found to be more strongly correlated with dissociation and cognitive
dimensions than sleep. Together, these findings indicate that dissociation is related to difficulty
in processing multiple stimuli and that the approaches used most often to study dissociation must
be critically examined.
Keywords: dissociation, cognition, attention, sleep, mood, undergraduate
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Decreased Attentional Abilities are Related to Dissociation in Undergraduates:
An Exploratory Study of Dissociation, Cognition, Sleep and Mood

Defining Dissociation
The term dissociation has been used to describe an array of phenomena ranging from the
everyday experience of daydreaming to inter-identity amnesia among alters in dissociative
identity disorder (DID). These perplexing and varying experiences have challenged theorists and
researchers to establish a coherent theory of dissociation. Over the past century, many
researchers have grappled with the construct of dissociation, but they have yet to reach a
consensus on its definition, etiology, or cognitive correlates.
The latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-V)
defines dissociation as, “a disruption and/or discontinuity in the usually integrated functions of
consciousness, memory, identity, emotion, perception of the environment, body representation,
motor control, and behavior” (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). While not all
dissociative experiences are considered pathological, the DSM-V describes five distinct
dissociative disorders. The most widely known among these is dissociative identity disorder
(DID), in which an individual coexists alongside personality “alters” and often has no memory of
what his or her alters have done or awareness that they exist in the first place. Other dissociative
disorders include dissociative fugue, in which individuals suddenly forget their identity,
depersonalization disorder, in which individuals frequently feel a detachment from themselves or
their environment, and dissociative amnesia, in which individuals experience forgetting of major
life events or aspects of their lives (Lynn, Lilienfeld, Merckelbach, Giesbrecht, & Kloet, 2012).
Additionally, the DSM-V includes a category for dissociative disorder not otherwise specified
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(APA, 2013). However, the inclusion of any dissociative disorders in the DSM is contested as
some believe that because there is no well understood etiology or consistent definition of these
phenomena, diagnoses are extremely subjective and carry negative implications for the
individuals diagnosed (Gharaibeh, 2009). Despite these concerns, the general consensus among
researchers, reflected in the DSM-V, is that these phenomena and disorders are legitimate and
that understanding them is important for both prevention and treatment (e.g., Elzinga et al., 2007;
Gingrich, 2009; Sierra & Berrios, 1998).
Additionally, the latest version of the DSM published in May of 2013, added a
dissociative subtype of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; APA, 2013). This change reflects
the assertions of many researchers that a significant number of PTSD sufferers experience
derealization and amnesia that could be classified as dissociative, and thus have a qualitatively
different disorder than PTSD without such experiences (Dalenberg & Carlson, 2012). These
revisions mark a movement among the psychiatric community toward acceptance of dissociation
both as a construct and as an independently occurring facet of common psychiatric disorders.
The other authoritative manual for diagnostics, the ICD-10, categorizes dissociative
disorders rather differently than the DSM-V. In addition to the categories of dissociative
amnesia, fugue, and motor disorders, the ICD-10 also includes pseudo-neurological symptoms
like conversion disorders, in which individuals experience physical symptoms such as seizures or
motor or sensory loss (WHO, 1992). While the DSM-V has dissociative identity disorder as its
hallmark dissociative disorder, the ICD-10 calls DID by its historical name, multiple personality
disorder, and categorizes it under the generic “Other dissociative disorders category” (WHO,
1992). Unlike the ICD-10, the DSM-V’s separation of somatoform disorders from dissociative
disorders aims to separate those disorders that may have a more organic and biological basis
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from more psychogenic conditions (Holmes et al., 2005). These discrepancies between the two
most widely accepted diagnostic tools illuminate the difficulty theorists and researchers face in
trying to articulate a definition of dissociation (Holmes et al., 2005). The disagreement over a
conclusive diagnostic categorization of dissociative disorders reflects the enormous challenges
associated with understanding the phenomenon on both a theoretical and empirical level.
Historically, research has explored dissociation from a clinical standpoint. Beginning in
the 19th century, Pierre Janet, often considered the father of dissociation, framed dissociation as a
component of hysteria, and noted that it was often paired with sleepwalking and other abnormal
sleep experiences (Bob, 2003). Little research was done after Janet until World War II, when
new interest in dissociation as it related to traumatic combat experiences led to the inclusion of
dissociative disorders in the DSM-III (3rd ed.; DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association,
1980).
The DSM-V and ICD-10 both describe a multitude of dissociative disorders, including
dissociative amnesia, dissociative fugue, and dissociative identity disorder (Holmes et al., 2005).
These pathologies are marked by extreme disruption in cognitive systems and reflect a drastic
departure from normal behavior. According to many theorists, these disorders are characterized
by five symptoms— depersonalization, derealization, amnesia, identity confusion and identity
alteration (SCID-D; Steinberg, 1994). Among these, depersonalization refers to detachment,
automatisms, and out of body experiences, and derealization refers to a change in perception of
the outside world, so that the surroundings seem to be disconnected from reality (APA, 2013).
Although dissociative disorders take many forms and have serious implications, research on
clinical populations is extremely limited because of the low prevalence rate, around 1.7%, with
only 0.4% prevalence of DID (Akyuz, Dogan, Say, Yargic, & Tutkun, 1999).
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In addition to the dissociative disorders, dissociative experiences are implicated in several
other disorders. As noted above, researchers and clinicians advocated for the inclusion of a
dissociative subtype of post-traumatic stress disorder in the DSM-V (Bryant, 2007; Dalenberg &
Carlson, 2012; Lanius et al., 2010). Proponents of this change argued that among PTSD patients,
those with dissociative symptoms have a unique presentation, and require different treatment
from those without dissociative experiences (Bryant, 2007). Given that dissociation is causally
linked with trauma, it is not surprising to see that dissociation is involved in this disorder defined
by severely traumatic experiences. Dissociation has also been implicated in disorders such as
schizotypy, borderline personality disorder, and sleep disorders (Giesbrecht & Merckelbach,
2008; Pec, Bob, & Raboch, 2014; Koffel & Watson, 2009). Although dissociation may be a
symptom of some serious psychological abnormalities, there is no clear understanding of the role
dissociation plays in various psychopathologies.
While research focusing on dissociation has direct clinical implications, studies of nonclinical samples can reveal underlying patterns of common dissociative experiences and help
build a theoretical understanding of the phenomena. Studies using non-clinical samples suggest
that most individuals experience some degree of dissociation (Ross, Joshi, & Curri, 1991),
although some argue that specific types of dissociation are strongly associated with pathology
(Rodewald, Dell, Wilhelm-Gossling, & Gast, 2011). Further, many researchers argue that
dissociative experiences fall along a continuum, with pathologies resulting when individuals very
high in dissociative tendencies experience these events to such an extent that they are interfering
with normal function. This continuum model also assumes that the types of dissociation do not
differ between the general population and those with dissociative pathologies, but what
differentiates them is the frequency and degree of these experiences as well as the ability to
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willfully stop dissociating (Giesbrecht, Lilienfeld, Lynn, & Merckelbach, 2008). The continuum
model allows for the possibility that pathological dissociation, like mood or intelligence, is a
matter of degree rather than quality of dissociative experiences. In contrast, some researchers
assert that the types of dissociation experienced by the general population are qualitatively
different than the experiences of psychiatric patients (Rodewald et al.), and some factor analytic
studies of clinical vs. non-clinical samples lend support to these contentions (Olsen, Slapp, Parra
and Beck, 2013). The degree to which dissociation exists on a single continuum or consists of
multiple but distinct dissociative tendencies continues to be debated.
History of Dissociation Research
Pierre Janet first used the term “dissociation” in his Psychological Automatism (Janet,
1890; Bob, 2003). His main concerns were hysteria and hypnosis, situations in which an
individual’s consciousness is controlled either partially or completely by previous experience
instead of the present environment (Bob). In his view, dissociation was a coping mechanism
adopted after the experience of intense traumatic events (Giesbrecht et al., 2008). Additionally,
Janet was interested in somnambulism and other abnormal forms of consciousness, and he
considered these phenomena to be the result of weakened mental states (Bob). Subsequent
theorists built their understanding of dissociation around Janet’s trauma model, assuming that
dissociation is a maladaptive coping mechanism following severe trauma.
Although less influential in the early literature, Jackson’s (1835-1911) model of the mind
and self also created a framework for early theorizing about dissociation. He believed that the
prefrontal cortex was responsible for creating and maintaining a sense of self and that
dissociation was a disruption of the most recent evolutionary advances, namely prefrontal
cortical activity and its role in sense of self (Meares, 1999). He proposed that dissociative events
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could be related to selective attention and disconnections of memory (Meares). As most of his
contemporaries were interested in psychodynamic explanations of dissociation, Jackson’s brainbased view was decades ahead of his time, but failed to attract followers.
While dissociation been observed in patients for nearly a hundred years (e.g., Allen,
1932), dissociative disorders were not formally recognized until the publication of the 3rd edition
of the DSM. Following World War II, resurgence in interest in dissociative experiences,
especially related to combat fatigue, fueled research and acceptance of dissociative disorders
(Bob, 2003). This mid-century diagnostic manual marked the beginning of widespread
acceptance of dissociation and included the diagnoses of multiple personality disorder,
depersonalization disorder, and psychogenic fugue (APA, 1980).
Recent Theories of Dissociation
Following Janet, many theorists have continued to work with trauma-based models for
dissociation. According to the trauma model, dissociation is the direct result of a traumatic
experience, often childhood sexual abuse, and mediated by biological and psychological
vulnerabilities, age, life stress and social support (Dalenberg et al., 2012). Essentially, these
theorists assert that dissociation is a coping strategy adopted by some who experience severe
trauma and that disorders occur when the mind extends this strategy to other areas.
These trauma models often incorporate the concepts of cognitive compartmentalization and
detachment (Holmes et al., 2005). In these theories, compartmentalization refers to a disintegration of psychological processes, and detachment refers to the experience of being
separated from the present and self (Holmes et al.). According to these theorists, traumatized
individuals may cope by separating the traumatized self, which includes all memories and
emotions related to the traumatic experience, from the rest of consciousness. Dissociation itself
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can be thought of as a psychological response to a serious threat that enables detachment from
potentially harmful memories and attempts to preserve some part of the healthy self (Dalenberg
et al.). By separating the vulnerable self from a traumatic memory, the individual attempts to
preserve function as much as possible.
Evidence for the trauma model is based mostly on cross-sectional data of traumatized
individuals (Lynn et al., 2014). A meta-analysis on over 100 studies reported a moderately strong
relationship between self-reported dissociation and trauma history in many samples, including
those from clinical, undergraduate, and general populations (Dalenberg et al., 2012).
Additionally, most patients with diagnosed dissociative disorders report a previous traumatic
event (Forrest, 2001). Data consistently indicate a relationship between trauma and dissociation,
but are limited by the inherent subjectivity of self-reports and the ethical obstacles to any
experimental approach.
Critics of this trauma model argue that the cross-sectional data do not provide enough
empirical evidence and that suggestibility may be causing the observed relationship between
self-reported trauma and dissociation (Spanos, 1994; Lynn et al., 2014). The individuals
reporting trauma may in fact be highly suggestible and fantasy-prone, and it could be one or both
of these traits leading to increased dissociative tendencies as well as false reports of traumatic
experiences (Merckelbach & Muris, 2011). A final criticism of the trauma model is that if trauma
is a necessary antecedent to dissociation, then people without a history of trauma would never
experience dissociative events. However, data from numerous studies indicate that dissociation
is present at non-clinical levels in the general population (Giesbrecht et al., 2008). While trauma
theory may be appropriate for individuals with severe dissociative disorders, it fails to explain
the commonplace dissociative occurrences that many people experience.
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Another approach, the sociocognitive model, identifies dissociative identity disorder not
as a result of trauma, but instead as a result of cueing and reinforcement by therapists and media
(Spanos, 1994). According to this model, during sessions, therapists encourage spontaneous
role-playing as one imagines oneself as another person, and eventually these alternate selves
become so engrained in the individual’s self-concept they display the symptoms of dissociative
identity disorder (Sarbin & Coe, 1972). This theory is supported by a rise in DID cases in the
late 20th century--as media portrayal of the disorder increased, therapists using hypnosis as a
treatment in suggestible clients, unintentionally induced these dissociative coping mechanisms,
according to this theory (Lilienfeld et al., 1999).
While this model explains the sudden rise in DID cases, it does not offer an explanation
for dissociative experiences in the general population. Notably, if dissociation only occurs
following a therapist cue or in specific social contexts, there should be populations in the world
where the rates of dissociative experiences are much lower or even nonexistent due to a lack of
Western influence. However, cross-cultural studies from many countries including Turkey, the
Philippines, and others (Yargic, Sar, Tutkun, & Alyanak, 1998; Gingrich, 2009) indicate that
non-clinical dissociative phenomena occur naturally around the world. Faced with these
objections to the sociocognitive model, theorists searched once again for an explanation for
dissociative phenomena.
An alternative, which will be referred to as the fantasy proneness model, proposes that
dissociation is a process that can occur without traumatic antecedent or therapeutic encounters in
any person based on a trait-like predisposition to dissociate (Giesbrecht et al., 2008). Instead of
being directly caused by trauma, extreme cases of dissociation such as dissociative amnesia or
dissociative identities are caused by suggestion and its increased effect on highly suggestible
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individuals (Lynn et al., 2014). Proponents of the fantasy proneness model assert that individuals
high in the traits of suggestibility and fantasy proneness are more likely to dissociate and to
report a history of trauma, real or imagined (Giesbrecht et al.). Researchers have observed a
correlation between fantasy proneness scales and trait scales of dissociation (Merckelbach &
Muris, 2001), and this fantasy proneness may explain reports of both dissociative experiences
and traumatic history. The more fantasy-prone and suggestible an individual is, the more likely
the suggestion of traumatic history will create a false memory or fantasy. Even without any
reports of trauma, fantasy proneness may be connected to a tendency to dissociate as individuals
engage in more daydreaming and fantastical thinking (Giesbrecht et al.,). For understandable
reasons, this theory is controversial among those who research dissociative disorders and believe
they are the result of trauma (e.g., Dalenberg et al., 2012).
Fantasy proneness theorists propose that there is a common mechanism underlying both
high trait dissociation and increased suggestibility and fantasy proneness (Giesbrecht et al.,
2008). The idea that there exists an underlying natural propensity to dissociate could explain how
otherwise healthy individuals without any social pressure or traumatic events can still have
significant dissociative experiences (Merckelbach, Rassin, & Muris, 2000). In addition to
offering a possible explanation for DID, this model frames dissociation as a natural process that
allows for theoretical integration of dissociative experiences in the general population
(Giesbrecht et al.). While both the trauma and sociocognitive models require a distinct
antecedent event for dissociative experiences, only the fantasy proneness model presents the
possibility of a natural tendency to dissociate under normal circumstances, and is thus the most
useful of the three theories for any study focusing on non-clinical samples.
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Diagnostic Instruments
Based on the DSM-IV, the Standardized Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Dissociative
Disorders (SCID-D; Steinberg, 1994) is the authoritative diagnostic tool for dissociative
disorders. The SCID-D identifies five main components of dissociation: depersonalization,
derealization, amnesia, identity confusion and identity alteration. In this context,
depersonalization refers to feeling as though one is living outside of their own body and
derealization refers to a feeling that one is operating as if in a movie or not in control of one’s
own actions (van der Kloet, Merckelbach, Giesbrecht, & Lynn, 2012). This interview has served
as the standard for interview-based dissociative disorder diagnosis, but it is still difficult for
clinicians to discriminate these disorders from others such as borderline personality disorder and
schizotypy based on the interview alone (Giesbrecht et al., 2008). Further, since the SCID-D is
rather lengthy, only a limited number of studies have used this interview as a primary
dissociative measure. Studies using small clinical samples often use the interview (e.g., RiveraVelez, 2014), but most studies using undergraduate or nonclinical samples use self-report
measures or briefer interviews.
Most published studies use a self-report diagnostic screening tool, the Dissociative
Experiences Scale (DES), as their primary measure for trait dissociation. This 28-item scale was
first developed in 1986 by Bernstein and Putnam to assess the frequency with which individuals
experienced a number of dissociative symptoms (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986). These items range
from rather common experiences such as, “Some people find that sometimes they are listening to
someone talk and they suddenly realize that they did not hear part or all of what was said” (Item
2) to more pathological items such as “Some people sometimes find writings, drawings, or notes
among their belongings that they must have done but cannot remember doing” (Item 26).
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Although this tool has been used in hundreds of studies as a measure of dissociation, it is
important to note that it is only a screening tool to measure the frequency of dissociative
experiences and not meant to diagnose individuals with dissociative disorders.
Analyses of the DES items in both clinical and general populations have led researchers
to identify distinct components of dissociation. Factor analyses of the DES have generated
various models, ranging from single-factor to four-factor solutions, depending on the population
studied (Olsen et al., 2013). In a recent study Olsen, Slapp, Parra and Beck, (2013) proposed a
2-factor model, with one factor emphasizing less pathological experiences, like absorption, and
the other assessing more significant symptoms like amnesia and depersonalization. In contrast, a
factor analysis of 1,055 non-clinical participants completed by Ross in 1991 indicated that the
DES has three distinct components: absorption, amnesia and depersonalization (Ross et al.,
1991). The absorption factor includes 12 items that are generally benign and refer to experiences
such as “Some people have the experience of finding themselves in a place and having no idea
how they got there” (Item 3). The second factor, amnesia, refers to dissociated states that one
would expect to see more in pathological cases of dissociative identity disorder. The amnesia
factor includes four items and includes statements such as “Some people have the experience of
finding themselves dressed in clothes that they don’t remember putting on” (Item 4). The last
component, depersonalization-derealization, consists of five items including “Some people have
the experience of feeling that their body does not seem to belong to them” (Item 13).
Interestingly, this three-factor solution for the DES combines depersonalization and
derealization, while the SCID-D separates the two as discrete.
The various outcomes of factor analysis for the DES have led to controversy over the
measure’s effectiveness to detect pathological dissociation. Some argue that the absorption
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component of the DES should be separated from the other items due to its overlap with the trait
dimension openness to experience (Rauschenberger & Lynn, 1995). This approach is consistent
with the recently proposed two-factor model (Olsen et al., 2013). In general, studies of
nonclinical populations find that scores for the absorption component are higher than the
remaining items (Ross et al., 1991), indicating that these items may reflect more commonplace
dissociative experiences. Since this inclusion of a more conventional trait related to dissociation
makes it more difficult to distinguish between the pathological and non-pathological, some
researchers use a modified version of the DES, called the DES-Taxon, or DES-T, to assess levels
of pathological dissociation. This modified version includes only the eight items encompassing
derealization, depersonalization, and psychogenic amnesia (Waller, Putnam, & Carlson, 1996).
As a result of removing the absorption items, this version of the DES is more effective at
identifying pathological levels of dissociation. For this reason, the DES-T is often used instead of
the DES in clinical populations (e.g., Irwin, 1999; Simeon, Guralnik, Schmeidler, Sirof &
Knutelska, 2001).
Finally, a third category of assessment instruments involves clinician-administered
measures, most notably, the CADSS, a 19-item assessment of dissociation conducted in person
(Bremner et al., 1998) and used in some previous sleep research (e.g., van Heugten-van der
Kloet, Giesbrecht, & Merckelbach, 2015). In a recent study (Condon and Lynn, 2015), the
CADSS had good reliability and demonstrated both convergent and discriminatory validity when
correlated with other measures of dissociation or negative affect. The benefit of the CADSS is
that it includes both self-report items and clinician observer ratings to assess dissociative
tendencies.
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As evidenced by the various measures and assessment approaches, defining and
measuring “dissociation” may be problematic. One additional approach separates dissociative
experiences into two categories—detachment and compartmentalization. In this model,
detachment encompasses the experiences defined by derealization such as feeling as though one
is moving like an automaton as well as depersonalization, including out-of-body experiences.
Compartmentalization includes the amnesia and more conversion-like experiences such as
hallucinations and sensory loss (Holmes et al., 2005). While compartmentalization encompasses
a broad variety of psychological and somatic experiences, detachment seems to offer insight into
the neuropsychological processes underlying dissociation. Researchers have suggested that this
detachment, marked by increased vigilance and widening of focus, is due to frontal inhibition of
the limbic system as well as activation of the right prefrontal cortex (Sierra & Berrios, 1998).
Despite the variety of ways to cluster dissociative experience, many still believe that
dissociative experienceson fall on a single continuum. Although the DES has often been factor
analyzed, its high internal consistency (α = .92; Bernstein & Putnam, 1986) supports the
contention that dissociation can be viewed as a single continuum. Additionally, some factor
analyses (e.g., Holtgraves & Stockdale, 1997) have found that outcomes in non-clinical samples
reveal only the single factor of dissociation, instead of the three-fold absorption, amnesia and
derealization factors that are commonly accepted. Controversy continues over whether or not
dissociative processes are actually a single construct expressed to varying degrees or a
constellation of qualitatively different experiences. Regardless of these debates, the DES is the
standard self-report tool for measurement of dissociation, and the three-factor model is widely
employed in research.
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Dissociation and Cognition
While theorists have argued about the antecedents of dissociative disorders, there has
been limited discussion about what these theories imply in terms of cognition and underlying
brain function. Trauma and sociocognitive theories both propose that specific events trigger the
creation of dissociative pathways in the brain, potentially between the limbic system and
prefrontal cortex that are absent in the general population (Sierra & Berrios, 1998). However, the
fantasy proneness model suggests that individuals have a natural underlying propensity for
fantasy unrelated to trauma or sociocognitive context, which suggests biological differences may
make individuals vulnerable to dissociation. Two separate theories, the trauma theory and the
construction hypothesis, approach dissociation from a cognitive diathesis-stress perspective to
explain why certain individuals develop these dissociative tendencies.
de Ruiter’s construction hypothesis describes dissociation as the result of enhanced
attentional capacity that leads to elaborated encoding of traumatic events and increased
dissociative experiences in traumatized individuals (de Ruiter, Phaf, Elzinga, & van Dyck,
2004). Researchers defending this theory argue that heightened cognitive vigilance is correlated
with increased working memory, levels of attention, and episodic memory (de Ruiter, Elzinga, &
Phaf, 2006). This connection between dissociation and increased attentional abilities seems
contradictory at first, as the primary signs of dissociation are amnesia related to important events
and depersonalization. However, these theorists argue that it is in fact the greater memory and
attentional capacity in these individuals that leads to their enhanced ability to encode memories
(de Ruiter et al., 2006). They argue that the heightened memory for traumatic events often seen
in dissociative individuals reflects these enhanced cognitive functions.
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On the other side of the argument, the betrayal trauma theory posits that dissociation is a
result of a decrease in executive functioning due to the inability of individuals to selectively
attend to relevant information and inhibit irrelevant information (Giesbrecht, Meckelbach,
Geraerts, & Smeets, 2004; DePrince & Freyd, 1999). In the context of trauma theory, this failure
of inhibition means that individuals are unable to block the intrusion of memories, especially
those of the traumatic event itself, especially in stressful or emotional contexts (Freyd,
Martorello, Alvarado, Hayes, & Christman, 1998). According to this model, dissociation is
always a result of some sort of trauma, mental or physical, and is used to maintain necessary
attachment with a caregiver or trusted adult after he or she has betrayed the individual (SaidelGoley, Albiero, & Flannery, 2012). Proponents of this account could say that the variability in
cognition leads to traumatic events having differential effects, and the more affected individuals
are more likely to experience dissociation. However, this traumatic effect could be explained by
either enhanced cognition over-representing an event or decreased ability to appropriately
process the experience. With so many potential theoretical explanations for cognition and
dissociation, it is difficult to narrow our research focus and understand what is happening on the
most basic cognitive level.
Learning more about the directionality of the relationships between dissociation and the
most fundamental cognitive processes may lead to identification of brain differences in
dissociative individuals and offer explanations of how those differences lead to dissociative
experiences. Additionally, understanding the cognitive profiles of dissociative individuals can
provide information about what is occurring in the brain during these experiences. Although the
most striking symptom of dissociation is often episodic memory loss, understanding the
fundamentals of how the brain can go “off-line” entails an exploration of basic attention.
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Dissociation and Attention
In a dissociative event, an individual is either failing to process part of what is going on
in the environment around them or is not encoding in a way that facilitates future retrieval. This
basic model of dissociation points to a cognitive failure in attention. Attention can be defined as
“the differential allocation of information processing resources” (Lawrence & Klein, 2012).
Attention can be modeled in four parts: arousal, vigilance, selective, and divided (Banich &
Compton, 2011). At the most basic level, attention refers to the arousal and ability of an
individual to take in any information or to process information from the environment. Another
aspect of attention, called either vigilance or sustained attention, refers to the ability to attend to a
certain aspect of the stimulus or environment for an extended amount of time. Selective
attention refers to the brain only attending to relevant stimuli while ignoring everything else in
the environment. Last, divided attention refers to attending to multiple separate stimuli
concurrently (Banich & Compton). This four-fold model of attention provides a useful
framework for considering dissociative events.
Let’s use an example of a dissociative experience that occurs while attending a lecture in
which you suddenly realize that you have no idea what has been said for the past few minutes. If
we start with the first category of attention, we would explore if you were awake and capable of
processing information. Perhaps this dissociative event is best characterized by a state of
consciousness somewhere in between wakefulness and sleep in which it is impossible to attend
to information. Another potential explanation is that this dissociative event was a failure of
sustained attention. Perhaps you were originally able to attend to the lecture, but the ongoing
lecture simply depleted your attentional capacity. In this case, it seems as though dissociation
may be a failure to remain attentive for an extended amount of time. Another possibility is that
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your selective attention abilities are to blame. If the brain is not capable of selective attention,
you could have been processing information about the lawnmower outside or the pattern of stains
on the carpet instead of paying attention to the lecture. The last option, divided attention, could
account for the dissociative event if you were only able to pay attention to the visual slides and
failed to encode the auditory message of what the professor was actually saying.
Alternatively, increased attentional abilities may also explain what is happening when the
mind dissociates. According to this theory, an individual with higher attentional capacity may
only attend when the stimulus is demanding enough to fully engage the individual’s attention. If
the stimulus requires little cognitive capacity, the individual may attend to more interesting
things such as daydreaming (de Ruiter et al., 2006). This theory also can be applied to all aspects
of attention. An individual with extremely high working memory capacity may “tune out” in a
task requiring them to remember only a few numbers or letters but actually perform better than
average on a demanding and entertaining working memory task. Similarly, the brain wellequipped for selective attention may find a simple task like short Stroop paradigms less
engaging, and other more complex tasks more interesting.
Additionally, working memory, typically defined as the ability to retain and manipulate
information for a short amount of time (Banich & Compton, 2011) offers a potential explanation
of dissociative events. Numerous studies have provided evidence of a strong link between
working memory and various types of attentional processes (de Ruiter et al., 2006). Deficits in
working memory are related to a problem with general arousal in that an affected individual is
unable to take in the necessary information. Working memory can be thought of as the gateway
for information; if the messages aren’t even passing through the gate, then there is no way that
information processing can occur. Storing memories requires that information be processed on
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this initial level. If someone’s working memory capacities aren’t functioning properly, then their
ability to encode long term memories is also compromised, which could account for the apparent
memory loss in dissociative events (Dorahy, McCusker, Colbert, & Mulholland, 2006). In fact, if
working memory is impaired, then the memory of the event is not so much lost as never created
in the first place (Baddeley, 1984). Alternatively, enhanced working memory also offers a
potential explanation of dissociative events (de Ruiter et al., 2004). When the task is not
demanding, someone with higher capacity will likely attend to more interesting tasks instead,
thus dissociating from the present environment (de Ruiter et al.).
Both attention and working memory appear to be controlled primarily by the prefrontal
cortex (PFC). Working memory in particular is related to activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC; Banich & Compton, 2011). This area, particularly in the right hemisphere, also
seems to be very active in sustained (Sarter, Givens, & Bruno, 2001) and divided attention
(Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, & Petersen, 1991). Selective attention, on the other
hand, appears to require activity from several other parts of the brain, including the thalamus,
superior colliculus, and the medial prefrontal cortex (Banich & Compton, 2011). Most
importantly, all of these functions seem to be governed by the prefrontal cortex, which reflects
the executive nature of attentional control.
Studies of Dissociation and Cognition
Over the past 15 years, researchers have explored the relationship between these various
cognitive functions and dissociative tendencies in both clinical and non-clinical samples.
Although research into the cognitive profiles of individuals with PTSD had been studied for
decades, this movement marked the first exploration of the cognitive underpinnings of
dissociation.
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The first of these researchers, Jennifer Freyd, was a proponent of the betrayal trauma
theory and asserted that dissociative individuals exhibit decreased cognitive abilities, especially
in emotional contexts (Freyd et al., 1998). Two experiments using standard and emotional
versions of the Stroop paradigm found that high dissociators showed more interference,
indicating decreased selective attention abilities and increased dual-attention abilities (Freyd et
al.; DePrince & Freyd, 1999). The authors concluded that dissociation is connected to attention
and memory, and that since dissociative individuals are better at divided attention than selective
attention, they may habitually attend to multiple stimuli instead of focusing on one. This strategy
of dividing the consciousness, according to Freyd, may be what explains the development of
dissociative tendencies in traumatized individuals (DePrince & Freyd). Freyd also proposes that
the decreased selective attentional abilities of dissociative individuals indicate a generalized
difference in attentional control, which may lead to the dissociated cognitions (Freyd et al.).
These first two studies in the area of dissociation and cognition asserted an inverse relationship
between dissociation and attention and established the framework for future research.
In a subsequent study exploring cognitive inhibition and interference in individuals with
dissociative identity disorder, Dorahy and his colleagues found that in a stressful situation,
dissociative individuals experienced weakened inhibition and high levels of negative priming
effects, which are indicative of lower selective attention capabilities (Dorahy et al., 2006). This
result was consistent with Freyd’s findings, furthering the argument that dissociation is linked to
attentional deficits.
In contrast, a subsequent study analyzed the working memory of dissociative participants
using fMRI and found that higher levels of dissociation were linked to increased activation of the
DLPFC as well as to better performance on simple working memory tasks (de Ruiter et al.,
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2006). This marks the first point of contradiction in the field; Dorahy had predicted that
dissociative individuals would show decreased working memory capacity, especially in high
anxiety situations, in line with their decreased attentional abilities (Dorahy et al, 2006). Since
working memory and selective attention are believed to be linked, these conflicting studies cast
doubts on the betrayal trauma theory and led to the creation of the construction hypothesis,
which proposes that dissociation is related to enhanced encoding of events, resulting in more
potent memories that in turn are associated with dissociative symptoms.
The first proponents of the construction hypothesis, de Ruiter and colleagues, found that
among undergraduates, individuals with higher trait dissociation performed better on a working
memory task than those who scored in the low range on the DES (de Ruiter et al., 2004). In
particular, their findings indicated that high dissociators showed superior performance when the
task demands were higher. In their view, this high working memory capacity is necessary for an
individual to engage in dissociation in the first place, as dissociation itself demands extra
capacity. The increased working memory then leads to enhanced encoding, particularly for
traumatic experiences, which results in increased strength of memories (de Ruiter et al.).
In another study, de Ruiter and his colleagues focused on the attentional abilities of
nonclinical dissociative individuals. In this experiment, the authors expected to see heightened
attentional abilities as measured by ERP in dissociative individuals, especially in negative
valence contexts, because the emotional context behind dissociation is so often traumatic (de
Ruiter, Phaf, Veltman, Kok, & Van Dyck, 2003). The study found that high dissociators scored
better on emotionally neutral selective and divided attention tasks, but valence only had an effect
on divided attention, with high dissociators showing enhanced divided attention. The theory
posited that these increases in working memory span and attentional abilities in response to
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trauma occurred in those who were predisposed to dissociative tendencies (de Ruiter et al.). The
same group conducted a similar study examining high dissociative and low-dissociative healthy
individuals using fMRI and two simple working memory tasks. The results of this study also
indicated that increased dissociation is linked to higher working memory capacity, and the
researchers localized this difference to increased activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(Veltman et al., 2005). Once again, the enhanced working memory of highly dissociative healthy
individuals indicated that dissociation could be an information processing style that occurs
independent of trauma history.
A later review (de Ruiter et al., 2006) of fMRI and ERP studies of higher attention and
working memory capacity in pathological and nonpathological individuals supported the
construction hypothesis (de Ruiter et al.). A year later, the same team published data from fMRI
of individuals with pathological dissociation (Elzinga et al., 2007). In this follow up study,
dissociative individuals showed higher working memory capacity in comparison to the healthy
controls as well as increased use of left anterior prefrontal cortex (PFC), dorsolateral PFC, and
the parietal lobe, all of which are implicated in working memory (Elzinga et al.). The observed
patterns serve as evidence that dissociative tendencies in both pathological and nonpathological
individuals are related to enhanced attention and working memory.
Some researchers have explored a greater variety of executive functions in relation to
dissociation. In an experiment using a Random Number Generation task, researchers hoped to
find a connection between dissociation and overall executive functioning in undergraduate
students (Giesbrecht et al., 2004). The study showed only modest correlations (r =.20 and .23)
between executive functions, measured by failure of inhibition for wrong answers, and the
amnesia subscale of the DES. The authors concluded that this relationship supported a
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connection between dissociative tendencies and overall prefrontal cortical function (Giesbrecht
et al.). Importantly, this study stands alone in the literature in using a correlational design and a
larger sample size (185 undergraduates). Most studies examining non-clinical samples employ
extreme group approaches using a highly dissociative group (DES>20) and a low dissociative
group (DES<10). This methodology provides distinct comparisons between the groups, but also
ignores the majority of the population whose dissociative tendencies are somewhere in the
middle. If dissociation truly exists on a continuum, then a correlational model may be the most
appropriate way to analyze associations between dissociation and cognitive dimensions.
This body of research has not developed much since 2007, with Freyd continuing to
focus on attachment theory, Dorahy researching decreased working memory and attentional
abilities, and de Ruiter exploring enhanced working memory and attention in dissociative
individuals. To date, no single theory has reconciled the conflicting outcomes in studies of
memory and attention and their association with dissociation.
Several studies have explored aspects of these competing theories. In one study,
undergraduates completed the DES and several measures of executive function, including the
Dysexecutive Questionnaire, a self-report measure of executive difficulties (Bruce, Ray, Bruce,
Arnett, & Carlson, 2007). Although highly dissociative individuals reported having more
difficulties with executive function, there was no significant difference in the actual performance
on executive tasks between high and low dissociators. The increased complexity of tasks in this
study compared to the relatively simple tasks used in de Ruiter’s imaging studies may explain
the results. Instead of examining a specific capacity such as selective attention, Bruce et al. used
the Iowa Gambling Task and Wisconsin Card Sorting Task, activities which recruit many brain
areas, making it more difficult to identify specific cognitive differences in dissociators.
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In one study that excluded those with a history of trauma, high and low dissociators
completed tasks examining working memory, long-term memory, and executive control
(Amrhein, Hengmith, Maragkos & Hennig-Fast, 2008). The results indicated that high
dissociators had significantly worse performance in visuospatial working memory and executive
control functions as measured by perseveration errors (Amrhein et al.). The authors suggested
that the observed difference from the expected pattern may have been related to the fact that the
tasks were not difficult enough to elicit superior performance in the highly dissociative
individuals or that the study employed visual rather than verbal stimuli. Since this study
excluded participants with any trauma history, the pattern of poorer cognitive performance in
dissociators may be the most representative of the general, nonclinical population (Amrhein et
al.).
Another study using twelve women with histories of childhood sexual abuse and twelve
women without such a history reported similar results. Although this study primarily focused on
the differences between these two groups, the resulting negative correlations between the DES
and verbal memory, visual memory, executive functioning and attention (Rivera-Velez et al.,
2014) follow the patterns seen in the Amrhein study and the theories proposed by both Dorahy
and Freyd. Importantly, this study found a strong correlation between the DES and PTSD, which
means that any cognitive effects may not be due to dissociation alone. The authors point out that
the women who participated in the abused group in the study had more troubled childhoods and a
higher likelihood of general pathology than those from non-clinical populations (Rivera-Velez et
al.). Given the small sample size and the complicated history of the participants, the results
cannot be generalized, but do provide more evidence that dissociation may be related to
decreased attentional abilities.
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Recent research has also explored dissociation induced by a mirror-gazing task and its
association with cognitive dimensions (Brewin, Ma & Colson, 2013; Brewin & Mersaditabari,
2013). In one of these studies, the DES was not correlated with any cognitive domain. However,
individuals who were experimentally induced to dissociate did exhibit temporarily decreased
working memory and attentional abilities, particularly in the verbal modalities (Brewin, Ma, &
Colson). A subsequent study by the same group found that the extent of these cognitive deficits
was not related to the length of the dissociative induction (Brewin & Mersaditabari). These
results are particularly difficult to generalize to the general population because experimental
approaches, which examine cognitive abilities after a dissociation induction, are distinctly
different from exploring trait dissociation and its association with cognitive abilities.
Nonetheless, these results are consistent with theories proposing deficits in cognitive function
and are contrary to de Ruiter’s construction hypothesis.
Research on cognition and dissociation has failed to reveal any consistent patterns
between memory, attention, executive function and dissociative tendencies. Studies have
provided evidence for both betrayal trauma theory and the construction hypothesis with no
obvious explanation for the conflicting outcomes. Notably, most of the research has focused
solely on working memory and selective attention. Importantly, divided and sustained attention
also seem to be conceptually implicated in dissociative phenomena and could help untangle
contradictory results. Moreover, research has not explored more complex potential relationships
between dissociation and cognition, including the possibility of curvilinear associations between
aspects of attention, memory and dissociative tendencies. It could also be the case that both high
and low working memory and attentional abilities are associated with dissociation, and that the
methodologies used in the extant research have not allowed for exploration of this possibility.
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Sleep, Cognition and Dissociation
Sleep has also been implicated in dissociation. 19th century dissociation research was
linked to studies of hypnosis, which in turn, included sleep (Fassler, Knox, & Lynn, 2006). The
earliest conceptualizations of dissociation focused not on the trauma-induced
compartmentalization, but instead emphasized the intrusion of sleep states during waking hours.
In both dissociative events and dreams, people often experience depersonalization—feeling like
they are outside of their bodies, and have limited or no memory of the event subsequently. In
fact, some theorists propose that the alter personalities seen in DID may be explained best by
comparing alters to a dream character (Barrett, 1995). Could examining sleep’s relationship to
dissociation clarify the cognitive aspects of the phenomenon and advance our clinical
understanding of these disorders?
Sleep itself constitutes a massive area of psychological and biological research, most of
which is beyond the scope of this study. However, a basic overview provides a framework for
thinking about potential connections between dissociative phenomena, cognition and sleep.
Scientists have divided consciousness into three main categories—wake, REM (rapid eye
movement), and NREM (non rapid eye movement)—defined by the frequency and shapes of the
electrical brain activity (Mahowald & Schenck, 2001). Dreaming is highly associated with REM
sleep, although there is some evidence that there may be dreaming involved in NREM sleep as
well (Solms, 1997). Studies using PET scans have revealed that during REM sleep, individuals
show decreased activity in the primary visual cortex, the motor cortex, and the DLPFC (Braun et
al., 1998; Maquet et al., 1996). This connection to the DLPFC offers initial insight into the sleepdissociation relationship, as this part of the prefrontal cortex seems to be involved in both sleep
and attentional functions.
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Instead of viewing the three states of consciousness as entirely discrete and separate
identities, some researchers view them more as a continuum with in-between states that may
explain many complex phenomena (Mahowald & Schenck, 2001). Wakefulness and REM sleep
appear to have similar brain functions, and some theorists explain experiences such as lucid
dreaming, out of body experiences and hypnagogic/hypnopompic hallucinations as a result of the
transition between these two states (Mahowald & Schenck). Since REM usually comes
immediately after wakefulness or immediately before, overlap between NREM and wake is
thought to be less common. However, this transition state could explain various arousal disorders
as well dissociation (Mahowald & Schenck).
This connection between NREM sleep and dissociation is evidenced by the high
frequency of dissociative experiences among patients with sleep disorders, especially those that
are related to NREM sleep. As early as 1932, researchers were associating somnambulism, more
commonly known as sleep-walking, with dissociative events (Allen, 1932). Many of these cases
included a history of trauma, which researchers argued explained both the dissociation and sleep
disturbances (Allen). Various sleep-related abnormalities, including somnambulism, narcolepsy,
and wakeful dreaming have all been associated with dissociative events (Mahowald & Schenck,
2001). More recent studies have looked specifically into nightmare disorder, which is
characterized by recurrent nightmares, especially about a recent trauma (Agargun et al., 2003a;
Agargun et al., 2003b). Such studies have found that childhood abuse is correlated both with
DES scores and frequency of nightmare experiences. This research seems to support theories
about trauma and dissociation, since the character of nightmares seems to be highly related to the
traumatic event. However, this study like many mentioned before, only offers an explanation for
dissociative events and nightmares in a particular subset of people, and not in the general
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population. This research does not explain the possible association of nightmares and
dissociative events independent of trauma.
Research also explores the various ways that sleep disturbances affect cognition. Sleep
abnormalities come in three major categories: sleep loss, reduction, and fragmentation, all which
are known to affect the frontal lobe and overall executive function (Jones & Harrison, 2001). In
fact, one study found that after one night of disturbed sleep, participants showed impaired
vigilance (sustained attention), selective attention, and overall arousal (Santhi, Horowitz, Duffy,
& Czeisler, 2007). By decreasing overall arousal, sleep has an effect on nearly all brain
functions, including working memory and attention. Perhaps the cognitive differences observed
in highly dissociative individuals are actually a result of abnormal sleep. Given the contradictory
literature on dissociation and cognitive dimensions, the role of sleep abnormalities in each of
these areas deserves further examination.
In the last twenty years, instead of exploring sleep duration and quality, some research
has studied dissociation and experiences such as sleep paralysis, hypnagogic and hypnopompic
hallucinations, waking dreams, and lucid dreaming using the Iowa Sleep Experiences Scale
(ISES; Watson, 2001). Importantly, this scale includes items that are common in the general
population and do not presume trauma. The first study using this instrument reported that the
ISES had correlations between .30 and .52 with trait dissociation among the general population,
indicating that there is some sort of connection between these rather perplexing sleep
experiences and dissociative phenomena (Watson).
Dutch researchers Giesbrecht and Merckelbach continued the work on abnormal sleep
and dissociation, adding a morning-eveningness scale to explore sleep-wake cycles. They too
found that the DES was correlated with the ISES (r = 0.37), supporting Watson’s earlier findings
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(Giesbrecht & Merckelbach, 2004). These studies together seem to indicate some sort of
association between sleep-wake disturbances or sleep abnormalities and dissociative experiences.
The researchers propose that these nightmares, hallucinations, and lucid dreams occur during a
state of sleep somewhere closer to a waking state than Stage 3 or 4 sleep, and dissociative events
may occur during wakefulness but closer to a sleep state than is normal (Giesbrecht &
Merckelbach, 2004). This theoretical view offers an explanation not just for the cognitive
differences in dissociation but also for why they may be independent of trauma, as sleep-wake
cycle disturbances or sleep abnormalities may have various causes.
Koffel, Watson and their colleagues argued that the connection between the ISES and
DES may indicate that dissociative events are related to disruptions in sleep and wake states
(Koffel & Watson, 2009). By conducting a thorough review looking at both clinical and
nonclinical samples, they posited a plausible connection between these measures and offer three
possible theories explaining the associations. First, Mahowald’s theory of labile sleep states
offers an explanation related to disorders characterized by an active motor cortex and inhibited
attentional abilities, such as somnambulism (Koffel & Watson). Dissociators may be
experiencing a novel form of something like somnambulism. Second, Koffel and Watson posit
that trauma may lead to these sleep disturbances, which in turn result in dissociative events. Last,
the authors argue that personality traits such as absorption and fantasy proneness may result in
increased dissociative experiences, abnormal sleep experiences, or false self-reports on measures
(Koffel & Watson). While offering some of the first theories linking sleep and dissociation, the
authors acknowledge that further studies are necessary to determine which, if any, of these
possibilities actually accounts for dissociative phenomena.

EXPLORING DISSOCIATION AND ATTENTION

35

A major review on this sleep-dissociation connection supported the relationship of labile
sleep-wake states and dissociative events (van der Kloet et al., 2012). Van der Kloet and
colleagues also argue that the correlation between the ISES and DES in reviewed studies is only
weakly influenced by the lucid dreaming subscale, indicating that dissociation is more likely
related to general sleep experiences. The authors pointed out that the sleep experiences that are
most difficult to control (e.g. hallucinations and very vivid dreams) are most correlated with
dissociation, and perhaps these experiences could be characterized as those that occur in labile
sleep-wake states. In the review and in a subsequent path analysis, the authors concluded that the
predisposition to lability in the sleep-wake cycle leads to both sleep states intruding into waking
state and disruptions in cognition, including memory and attention (van Heugten-van der Kloet,
Merckelbach, Giesbrecht, & Broers, 2014; van der Kloet et al.).
Further studies from the same group have investigated disturbances in sleep cycles in
both clinical and nonclinical samples. In assessing baseline and post-treatment mood, sleep, and
dissociation, researchers found that normalized sleep patterns were associated with a decrease in
dissociative symptoms and that this effect was mediated by mood and general psychopathology
(van der Kloet, Giesbrecht, Lynn, Merckelbach, & de Zutter, 2011). Although the authors
focused on narcolepsy and general psychopathology, they did find significant positive
correlations between the DES and both the BDI and BAI, two of the most commonly used
measurements of mood (van der Kloet et al.) A later study by some of the same researchers
compared sleep quality with sleep experience in DID and PTSD patients. Once again, they found
a significant correlation between the ISES and DES (r = .63), and additionally found that the
ISES predicts membership to the dissociative group, while the PSQI, which measures more
general sleep quality, predicts membership to the PTSD group (van Heugten-van der Kloet,
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Huntjens, Giesbrecht, & Merckelbach, 2014). Together, these results support the notion that in
clinical samples, specific abnormal sleep patterns maybe associated with different dissociative
experiences.
In their most recent study, the same researchers shifted focus and experimentally
manipulated the sleep of healthy undergraduates through 36 hours of sleep deprivation in lab
while measuring dissociation, mood, sleepiness, and executive functioning throughout (van
Heugten-van der Kloet et al., 2015). They once again found a connection between baseline
dissociation and the ISES and saw increased dissociative symptoms after sleep deprivation.
Additionally, they found that changes in mood, measured by the Profile of Mood States
(POMS)OMS, mimicked the changes in dissociation, and they suggested that mood may be
interacting with sleep and dissociation (van Heugten-van der Kloet et al.). Additionally, they
found that highly dissociative individuals showed more dramatic deterioration of executive
functioning as their sleepiness increased, but this effect only reached marginal significance (van
Heugten-van der Kloet et al.). This study marks an important shift to experimental research on
sleep and dissociation in non-clinical samples that may provide more generalizable findings.
These new theories relating sleep abnormalities to dissociation are the first to integrate
many seemingly incompatible areas of research. Betrayal trauma theory, sociocognitive theory,
and fantasy proneness theory may be explained by these theoretical associations. If dissociation
can be explained by sleep/wake abnormalities, then it could be the case that traumatic events
cause a disruption in this cycle and thus link sleep and dissociation (van der Kloet et al., 2012).
Moreover, increased time spent in between the sleep and wake states and overall disrupted sleep
may be related to increased suggestibility and difficulty distinguishing fantasy from reality,
which could in turn cause an increased influence of clinician suggestion, supporting the
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sociocognitive theory. Last, increased lability in the sleep-wake cycle may similarly increase
fantasy-proneness as individuals experience dream-like states, thus providing a theoretical
explanation for connections between sleep, dissociation, and fantasy proneness (van der Kloet et
al., 2012). Clearly, this sleep angle offers a promising way to integrate competing explanations
and understand dissociative experiences.
Although this new sleep explanation has potential for unifying theories, the cognitive
aspects of dissociation need to be understood more thoroughly. Previous sleep research appears
to indicate that any disturbance in sleep leads to a decrease in attention and working memory
capacity. However, data on dissociation is inconclusive in this regard. If there is truly a
connection between sleep abnormalities and dissociation, we would expect that all types of
attention, including working memory, would be worse for highly dissociative individuals.
However, if these cognitive functions and dissociative tendencies actually follow a curvilinear
relationship, then these sleep results offer a distinct pathway for the inverse relationships
between attention and dissociation observed by Freyd and Dorahy, while also explaining de
Ruiter’s contention about higher cognitive abilities. For example, both very low and very high
dissociators may have reduced cognitive capacity, but only the high dissociators would have
positive correlations with sleep variables.
While sleep theories offer a possible reconciliation of the trauma, sociocognitive, and
fantasy proneness theories, they do not align the betrayal trauma theory with the construction
Hypothesis. These two theories propose fundamentally opposite associations between
dissociation and cognitive functions, with the former arguing that dissociation is the result of
decreased cognitive and executive function, and the latter positing an increase in those
capacities. Theories about the role of abnormal sleep in dissociation could only be used in
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support of the betrayal trauma theory because of the inverse relationship between abnormal sleep
and cognitive abilities.
Considerations in the Current Study
In order to study the connections between dissociation, sleep and cognition, I will adopt
the continuum model of dissociation. Since there is natural variation in general sleep experiences
in both the clinical and general populations, it is appropriate to assess both sleep and dissociation
on a continuum. Such an approach may provide more information about the nature of the
relationship between dissociative experiences and both sleep and cognitive abilities, and is
appropriate for a non-clinical sample. Additionally, a correlational method may be better suited
than an extreme-groups approach for data that is moderatelyy right-skewed, which is typical of
DES scores in undergraduate samples.
Although a handful of studies have looked at the cognitive correlates of dissociation, no
study to date has explored the various types of attention—sustained, selective, and divided—in a
non-clinical sample. Further, no extant research has investigated the possible role of sleep
disturbances in the cognition-dissociation relationship or the potential for sleep to reconcile
competing theories about dissociation and cognition. As a result, attention and memory as well
as sleep are of primary interest in the present study of dissociation. Although research on
episodic memory and emotional content is important in the field of dissociation, it is beyond the
scope of this research. Using completely neutral stimuli such as the Spatial Span and Conner’s
CPT should avoid confounding emotional effects. Examining working memory and types of
attention also isolates the DLPFC as a specific brain region of interest. Because these capacities
are so fundamental to all cognition, examining these foundational capacities in detail is a first
priority.
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Hypothesis of the Current Study
The current research will use extant definitions and measures of dissociation to explore
the associations between dissociative experiences, neurocognitive dimensions and sleep. At its
core, dissociation is a lack of connection between the conscious mind and either the self or the
environment. This decoupling can take many forms and ranges in degree, but is characterized by
a lack of normally integrated awareness. By assessing the full range of dissociation in a nontraumatized sample, this study explores the phenomenon and its correlates as they occur in the
general population.
Because dissociation is related to perception and awareness, I will explore working
memory and attention, two foundational aspects of cognitive processing. Previous research has
supported links between dissociation and both higher and lower capacities in these areas. No
previous research has studied divided and sustained attention in relation to dissociation, and to
date, research has not reported on the possibility of curvilinear associations between dissociation
and cognitive outcomes. The present research will also investigate the role of sleep in these
associations, as sleep disturbance has been implicated in both dissociative experiences and in
decreased cognitive performance, and it has the potential to reconcile competing theories about
cognitive correlates of dissociation.
For example, if we assume a linear relationship between cognitive function and
dissociation, the sleep disturbance explanation for dissociation would suggest that there should
be concomitant deficits in cognitive function in highly dissociative individuals due to sleep
disturbances. However, if we posit a curvilinear relationship between dissociation and cognitive
ability that would be reflective of the mixed directionality of previous studies, it could be the
case that low dissociators may have poorer cognitive performance independent of sleep. Either
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approach, curvilinear or linear, still begs the question of the directionality of these relationships.
The present study is a preliminary exploration of the relationships between sleep, dissociation
and specific aspects of attention and memory. By controlling for sleep in correlational analyses,
the present study can determine if the association between cognitive performance and
dissociation is a byproduct of sleep disturbance.
Method
Participants
76 undergraduates from Bates College in Lewiston, Maine (26 males, 50 females, 73.6 %
Caucasian, age M = 19.4 years (SD = 1.32)) were recruited through psychology classes and
emails to receive either course credit or $10 for participating. Exclusion criteria included lefthandedness, history of severe trauma, current use of psychoactive medication, and history of
learning disorders such as dyslexia.
Surveys and Questionnaires
Participants first provided informed consent and then completed a battery of surveys and
questionnaires at their own pace in the laboratory. This battery began with a demographics
questionnaire that provided a general overview of basic information. Participants indicated their
age, gender, years of education, handedness, history of learning disorder and any current
medications in blank spaces. Additionally, they indicated whether or not they had ever
experienced a severely traumatic event.
Participants next filled out the Profile of Mood States 2-Y (POMS 2-Y), to assess their
general mood over the week preceding testing. This scale includes 60 items on that are scored on
subscales of anger-hostility, confusion-bewilderment, depression-dejection, fatigue-inertia,
tension-anxiety, vigor-activity, and friendliness, and a total score measuring overall mood
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disturbance, with higher scores indicating more positive mood. All subscales and the total mood
disturbance were adjusted to gender norms. and adjusted to gender norms. The measure is
widely used to assess overall affect and has high internal validity consistency (α = .78-.95; Lin,
Hsiao, & Wang, 2014). Scoring provided individual subscale scores adjusted to gender norms as
well as a total score corresponding to overall mood, with higher numbers indicating elevatedless
distressed mood in that area (Heucher & McNair, 2012). Since several mood disorders, such as
depression, are known to have an impact on neuropsychological tests as well as sleep
(McAllister-Williams et al., 1998), POMS scores will be used to control for mood.
Next, participants completed the Dissociative Experiences Scale II (DES II), which is
widely used to assess the degree to which samples, both clinical and non-clinical, dissociate
(Bernstein & Putnam, 1986). Participants indicated to what extent they experienced 28 different
items such as “Some people have the experience of finding themselves dressed in clothes that
they don’t remember putting on. Select a number to shown what percentage of the time this
happens to you” (item 4) by circling an answer on an 11-point Likert scale ranging from 0%
(never) to 100% (all the time; α = .92). The mean of answers on these measures was calculated
as the total DES score. In accordance with factor analyses by Ross et al. (1991), scores were
computed for subscales of absorption, amnesia, and derealization. Of these factors, absorption
measures such as “Some people find that when they are watching television or a movie they
become so absorbed in the story that they are unaware of other events happening around them”
(item 17) appear to be non-pathological in nature. Amnesia (e.g., “Some people find evidence
that they have done things that they do not remember doing” (item 25)) and derealization (e.g.,
“Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling as though they are standing next to
themselves or watching themselves do something as if they were looking at another person”
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(item 7)) are much less common in the general population and are believed to be more indicative
of dissociative pathology (Giesbrecht et al., 2008). While the DES officially provides a total
score on a range from 0 to 100, most sample distributions evidence a floor effect, with scores
above 30 being considered high (Carlson & Putnam, 1993). Although this floor effect is
reflective of skew, very few researchers appear to take this into account when performing their
analyses. For the total scale and three subscales, higher scores indicate a greater degree of trait
dissociation.
Next, participants completed the Iowa Sleep Experiences Scale (ISES), which consists of
18 items that analyze general sleep experiences as well as lucid dreaming experiences.
Participants answer items such as “I have a dream that is so vivid it influences how I feel the
following day” on a 7-point scale from 1 (never) to 7 (several times a week). The average of all
scores on the general subscale was used to measure sleep experience, with higher numbers
indicating more abnormal sleep (α = .86). The questions on this measure are qualitatively unique
from the more typical sleep scales (Watson, 2001).
Next, participants completed the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI), which measures
the overall quantity and quality of sleep. Scores covered seven domains: subjective sleep quality,
sleep latency, sleep duration, habitual sleep efficiency, sleep disturbance, use of sleep
medication, and daytime dysfunction over the last month. Additionally, a total score is calculated
to represent the overall quality of sleep (Buyesse et al., 1989).
Cognitive Measures
The WRAT-4 reading subtest requires participants to read aloud a list of 55 words as a
proxy measure of crystallized verbal measure of fluid intelligence. Comparing the total number
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of correctly pronounced words to age-appropriate norms provided a final standardized score,
with higher scores indicating higher overall intelligence (Wilkinson & Robertson, 2006).
The Conners CPT3 and CATA are computerized tests of sustained attention in which
participants monitor a screen or sounds from headphones for fourteen minutes. For the CPT-3,
participants were instructed to press the space bar on the keyboard in front of them for all letters
except “X”. For the CATA, participants were instructed to press the space bar when they heard a
high tone that had been immediately preceded by a low tone. The program provided standardized
and raw scores for inattentiveness, impulsivity, sustained attention, vigilance, and subscales
within each of those categories for types of errors (Conners, 2014). Additionally, after
completing the final task, which was either the CPT-3 or CATA, participants responded to the
prompt “Please estimate the duration of the task you just completed at the computer beginning
with the first trial after the practice and ending with the completion of the test” by filling out
blanks for minutes and seconds. The resulting error between their estimate and the actual length,
14 minutes, was used as an objective measure of dissociation. Experiments have shown that
dissociation is related to poorer time estimation (Brewin, Ma, & Colson, 2012), so it was
expected that individuals scoring higher on the DES would display greater error in time
estimation.
Participants also completed both the forward and backward versions of the WAIS-III
Digit Span task to assess verbal working memory. In the forward condition, participants listened
to the experimenter and repeated back increasingly long sequences of numbers. In the backward
condition, participants similarly heard lists of numbers and repeated them in the reverse order.
For each condition, the total number of sequences correctly answered before termination
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determined the raw score, and WAIS-III software calculated the normalized scores, with higher
scores indicating greater verbal working memory (Wechsler, 1997b).
As in Digit Span, participants underwent both forward and backward versions of the
WAIS-III Spatial Span task to assess nonverbal working memory. The experimenter tapped a
specific series of blocks on the testing stimulus and the participant repeated the sequence of
tapping or reversed it in the backward condition. The overall scored was determined by the
number of correct sequences tapped before the test was terminated, and WAIS-III software
calculated the normalized scores, with higher scores indicating better spatial working memory
(Wechsler, 1997b).
For the WAIS-III Letter-Number Sequencing Test, a more complex verbal working
memory task, participants heard a series of alternating letters and numbers and repeated the
sequences with the numbers first in numeric order, followed by the letters in alphabetical order.
The total number of correct responses was used as a raw score, and WAIS-III software calculated
the normalized scores, with higher scores indicating better verbal working memory (Wechsler,
1997a).
Participants also completed a computerized E-Prime task created for the purpose of this
study that was based on the 1982 experiment by Somberg and Salthouse to measure divided
attention. After introductory slides presenting each sound for five seconds and 20 practice trials
with feedback, pParticipants monitored a computer screen for 60 trials of 1 s length. Each trial
consisted of the presentation of three shapes evenly spaced on a line. Each shape could take one
of five forms: circle, triangle, square, star, plus. Additionally, each slide was accompanied with
either no sound or a high, medium or low frequency pitch. Participants were instructed to
monitor for whether or not a circle appeared and whether or not the medium frequency sound
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was present. For each slide, participants indicated the presence of both conditions by pressing
one of four keys on the number pad: 1 (incorrect sound, no circle present), 3 (correct sound, no
circle present), 7 (incorrect sound, circle present), or 9 (correct sound, circle present). Accuracy
and reaction time were recorded for each trial. The overall percent of trials correctly answered
was used to assess divided attention ability.
To measure selective attention, participants completed the Color Naming, Word Reading,
and Color-Word Interference conditions of the DKEFS Color-Word Naming Task. In the ColorWord Interference condition, participants recited only the word that is written while inhibiting a
response to the color in which the word appears. The overall time taken to complete the task and
the number of errors in each condition were used as raw scores, and DKEFS software provided
scaled scores for inhibition and errors as well as contrast scores which compared the scaled
scores on the inhibition task to the scores on the two simpler tasks (MacLeod, 1991).
Procedure
Participants completed all self-report measures before beginning the neuropsychological
batteries. After completing the demographic questionnaire, POMS-2, DES, ISES, and PSQI,
participants began the neuropsychological testing with the WRAT-4. Following the WRAT,
participants completed either the CPT-3 or CATA, which was determined by whether the
participant ID number was odd or even. Following the first sustained attention task, participants
completed Digit Span Forward and Backwards and then Spatial Span Forward and Backward.
Participants then completed the divided attention task, Letter-Number Sequencing, DKEFS
Color-Word Interference, and then the sustained attention task that they had not yet completed.
Immediately following completion of the final sustained attention task, participants answered the
time estimation question.
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Results
Descriptives
The mean DES score of the sample was M = 15.18 (SD = 10.58), and the mean ISES
general score was M = 2.88 (SD = 0.92). Means for sub-scales of the DES, sleep variables and
neurocognitive dimensions are summarized in Table 1. Preliminary analyses to test for gender
differences on key dimensions were carried out. Aside from verbal intelligence, measured by
WRAT (Male M = 115.3 (SD = 8.5), Female M = 110.6 (SD = 9.2)), there were no gender
differences on any of the measures (see Table 1). A one sample t-test showed that the sample
mean for WRAT (M = 112.2 (SD = 9.2) was significantly greater than the standardized norm (M
= 100, SD = 15), t(75) = 11.59, p < .001, indicating that this undergraduate sample had higher
intelligence scores than the general population.
Because dissociative phenomena are rare in the general population, pPrior to running
analyses, the distributions of the variables were examined. Skew of the total DES scores was
1.11, and the Shapiro-Wilk statistic was .887, p. < 001, indicating that the distribution of scores
was not normal. To test the impact of the skew on analyses, we ran analyses both with square
root transformed and untransformed DES scores. There were no significant differences in
outcomes using the transformed scores. Further, Spearman correlations were also run with total
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to normalize the distribution before running correlations with sleep or neurocognitive variables.
Comparisons of correlations of the raw and transformed derealization scores are shown in Table
2.
Correlational Analyses
An initial correlational analysis of all self-report measures and intelligence indicated a
significant relationship between affect as assessed by the POMS Total Mood Disturbance (TMD)
and trait dissociation as measured by the DES, r(76) = -.41, p < .01 (Figure 1). As in previous
studies, the DES scores were also significantly positively correlated with the general subscale of
the ISES, r(76) = .24, p < .05 and was marginally correlated with the PSQI, r(76) = .21, p = .10
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(Figure 2). Dissociation was only marginally correlated with sleep quality and intelligence, r(76)
= .21, p < .10 and
r(76) = -.19, p < .10, respectively. When controlling for affect using the POMS TMD, the
relationships between the DES and ISES decreased and the association and was no longer
significant, r(76) = .19, p = .10. Similarly, the relationship between DES scores and qualitative
sleep as measured by the PSQI was no longer significant when affect was controlled for, r(76) =
.02, p = .82, suggesting mediation (Table 3). A variety of analyses, including multiple
regressions that also controlled for gender, indicated that the association between sleep and
dissociation was almost entirely explained by negative affect. Because the relationship between
sleep and dissociation appeared to be explained by mood, further analyses concerning
dissociation and neuropsychological measures did not include sleep variables.
Contrary to expectations, dDissociation and time estimate error, an objective measure of
attention which asked participants to estimate the length of time associated with a specific task,
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were not significantly related, r(76) = .19, p = .11 (Table 4), but the amnesia subscale of the DES
was marginally significantly positively related to time estimate error, r(76) = .22, p < .10.
Vigilance/Working Memory
Working memory and dissociation had no significant relationship, as shown in Table 5.
Although only approaching significance, verbal working memory as measured by both Digit
Span and Letter Number was inversely related to DES scores, r(76) = -.18, p = .12 and r(76) = .10, p = .38, respectively, thus contradicting de Ruiter’s construction hypothesis. .
Based on previous research, DES scores were recoded into three groups to assess the
degree to which those low and high on in dissociation might differ on aspects of working
memory (low, DES <10 (N=29); medium,10<= DES < 20 (N=29); high, DES>20 (N=18)).
These cutoffs were used in accordance with the majority of the literature because most healthy
adults have scores below 10, and scores above 20 are considered indicative of potential
dissociative disorders (Carlson & Rosser-Hogan, 1993). An omnibus MANOVA run on digit
span forward, digit span backward, spatial span forward, spatial span backward, and letternumber sequencing was not significant (λ = .817, F(10, 138) = 1.47, p = .16). Despite the nonsignificant MANOVA, subsequent univariate ANOVAs of working memory were examined to
provide exploratory information about these dependent memory variables and in order to
compare data with previous literature. These analyses showed that the differences in digit span
forward scores between the low (M = 10.59, SD = 2.13), medium, (M = 11.76, SD = 2.10), and
highly dissociative groups (M = 9.83, SD = 1.82) were statistically significant, F(2, 76) = 5.30, p
= .01 (Table 6, Figure 3). Tukey’s HSD tests indicated that the medium DES group scored
significantly higher than the low and high dissociative groups. The high and low dissociative
groups were not found to be significantly different on any of the working memory measures.
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This result indicates that individuals scoring in the mid-range for dissociation had better working
memory scores than both highly dissociative individuals and those who scored very low on
dissociation.
Selective Attention
In support of the betrayal trauma theory, cCorrelational analysis of selective attention and
dissociation, shown in Table 7, revealed only a marginal inverse relationship between overall
DES score and the error contrast score, which indicates the relationship of errors made in the
incongruent condition with errors made in the color-naming and word-reading conditions of the
DKEFS Color-Word Naming task, r(76) = -.19, p < .10. The DES subscale of amnesia was
significantly inversely related to the scaled time contrast score, r(76) = -.23, p < .05. This scaled
time contrast score compares the scaled score of an individual’s time to complete reading in the
condition where the word and color were mismatched to their standardized scores measuring the
amount of time taken to complete reading the conditions with only colors or only words, thus
helping to control for factors such as general processing speed.
MANOVA was run to test for differences in selective attention as measured by DKEFS
Color-Word interference task measures of total errors, a contrast scaled score, and the scaled
score of just the inhibition condition between low, medium, and high DES score participants.
Wilks’ Lambda was not significant (λ = .90, F(10,138) = 1.29, p = .27). Univariate analyses
were examined for exploratory purposes and are shown in Table 8 and Figure 4. For both the
scaled total error score and scaled inhibition condition, those with medium levels of dissociation
scored the highest. On all measures, there was a pattern of low dissociators performing better
than high dissociators, although the differences did not reach significance.
Divided Attention

EXPLORING DISSOCIATION AND ATTENTION

50

Correlational analysis of divided attention and dissociation, shown in Table 9, revealed
no significant relationship between total DES score and divided attention accuracy scores, r(75)
= -.13, p = .26. The DES subscales of amnesia and derealization were both significantly
inversely related to accuracy in the divided attention task, r(75) = -.26, p <.05 and r(75) = -.27, p
< .05, respectively. These results indicate that as individuals score higher on dissociative amnesia
and derealization, their ability to accurately respond to stimuli requiring attention in multiple
modalities decreases.
A MANOVA was run to test for differences in divided attention as measured by accuracy
and reaction time in the computerized task between low, medium, and high DES score
participants. Wilks’ Lambda was not significant (λ = .92, F(10,138) = 1.50, p = .21). Although
the results fail to reach significance, Tukey’s HSD indicated that highly dissociative individuals
had the slowest reaction time (M = 2.34, SD = 1.03), while those in the medium dissociation
group had the fastest reaction times (M = 1.88, SD = 0.51), shown in Figure 5. Tukey’s HSD also
revealed that overall accuracy on the divided attention task mimicked the pattern between
dissociation and divided attention, with low dissociators performing best and high dissociators
performing worst, but this failed to reach significance in the between-groups analyses (Table 10).
Sustained Attention
Correlational analysis of sustained attention and dissociation, shown in Table 11,
revealed no significant relationship between total DES score and sustained attention measures.
The amnesia subscale of the DES was marginally correlated with CATA detectability, r(75) =
.21, p < .10, in the direction of more dissociative participants having lower auditory attention
over extended periods of time.
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A MANOVA was run to test for differences in sustained attention as measured by the
overall accuracy and change in performance over time in the both the CATA and CPT between
low, medium, and high DES score participants. Wilks’ Lambda was not significant (λ = .90,
F(10,138) = 0.97, p = .46). No consistent pattern between groups was observed across the four
dependent variables, so univariate ANOVAs were not run (Figure 6).
Suppression Effect of Affect
Because controlling for affect weakened the relationship between sleep and dissociation
and because previous studies have explored mood as a mediator between dissociation and
cognitionconnected worse mood with decreased cognitive abilities, partial correlations were run
controlling for affect as measured by the POMS total TMD score (see Table 12).. After
controlling for mood, the correlations between dissociation and selective and divided attention,
in particular, increased slightly in magnitude. These results suggest that because negative affect
is related to higher rates of dissociative experiences as well as worse cognitive performance,
mood may weaken the correlation between dissociation and attentional endpoints, acting as a
suppressor variable.
Curvilinear Analyses
Because associations between dissociation (DES total) and sleep were non-significant
once negative affect was controlled for (POMS TMD), curvilinear associations between
dissociation and sleep variables were not explored. In the case of dissociation and
neurocognitive dimensions, memory and Color-Word Naming selective attention tasks were
tested in curvilinear regression models based on previous analyses. Of the memory variables,
digit span total, which assesses verbal working memory, was a marginally significant predictor
of DES score when a quadratic curve was fit (F(2,73) = 2.44, p = .094), with low and high
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dissociators having lower memory scores. Quadratic models were not preferable for any other
memory variables. The selective attention measures were also tested in quadratic models, and
none of the models were significant.
Discussion
Contrary to expectations, correlational analyses did not indicate a meaningful relationship
between sleep and dissociation independent of mood. Because the relationship between sleep and
dissociation as measured both by a more typical qualitative sleep measure, the PSQI, and an
experiential measure, the ISES, was non-significant after controlling for mood, it was not
meaningful to explore the relationships between sleep, dissociation and cognition as initially
proposed. Subsequent analyses tested the relationships between dissociative tendencies as
assessed by the DES and specific neurocognitive dimensions. The correlations between
dissociation, specifically the derealization and amnesia subscales, and several attentional
measures, namely those of selective and divided attention, did reach significance. The present
study provides the first evidence that divided and selective attention may be important
neurocognitive correlates of dissociative phenomena. While the original hypotheses concerning
sleep’s mediating role in dissociation and cognition were not supported, several interesting and
novel results arose from the research.
Affect, Sleep, Dissociation, and Cognition
Previous research has reported associations between sleep and DES scores. Because both
sleep and dissociation may be correlated with negative affect, in the present study, mood was
also assessed using the POMS. As seen in Table 3, we found the expected significant
relationship between the DES and ISES, but the strength of this relationship was less than that
between the POMS and the DES, and when the analyses controlled for mood, the relationship
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between sleep and dissociation no longer reached significance. The present study is one of a few
to control for affect when assessing the relationships of various personality and neurocognitive
measures with dissociation. The present study’s finding that sleep and dissociation are not
associated when mood is controlled for conflicts with previous research that has posited a strong
theoretical relationship between sleep disturbances and dissociation.
While there is research on affect and sleep, very few studies have connected the POMS,
ISES, and DES specifically. Like the present study, van Heugten-van der Kloet et al. used the
ISES and POMS in an experimental study of sleep and dissociation in undergraduates (2015). In
addition, the authors use the SLEEP-50 scale, a more extensive measure of pathological sleep.
In these analyses, change in sleepiness did not predict dissociative experiences once mood was
controlled for in the early phases of the experiment. After significant sleep deprivation, there
were modest associations between sleep and dissociation, but the correlations between mood and
dissociation continued to be stronger. While these analyses had methodological shortcomings
related to multicollinearity, the findings support the possibility that in studies of participants who
have relatively normal sleep cycles, the effect of sleep on dissociation can be accounted for by
affect.
Previous literature on sleep and dissociation often includes the Beck Depression
Inventory and Beck Anxiety Inventory, especially in clinical samples (e.g., Elizinga et al., 2007;
Dorahy et al., 2006). As the POMS is a more general measure of negative affect that measures
not only anxiety and depression, but also confusion, fatigue, anger, and vigor, (Heucher &
McNair, 2012) it represents mood in general, not clinical depression or anxiety. Importantly, the
present study does not suggest that any specific mood disorders are related to dissociation.
Dissociation and Cognition
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As previous research provides evidence of dissociation being linked both to enhanced and
decreased levels of attentional ability, the present study did not have directional hypotheses for
the posited relationships between DES scores and various neurocognitive measures. However,
although not always reaching significance, the data do show a tendency for low dissociators to
have better working memory than high dissociators, which is consistent with some previous
clinical data (Dorahy et al., 2006), but contradicts most published findings (e.g., de Ruiter et al.,
2004; Elzinga et al., 2007; Giesbrecht et al., 2004). Notably, no pattern was apparent when
measuring sustained attention. Although the present study found no relationship between
sustained attention and dissociation, future studies could assess state dissociation during even
longer sustained attention tasks and explore the possibility of a causal relationship between
boredom or cognitive fatigue and dissociation.
While the correlations between total dissociation and working memory did not reach
significance, correlations of the amnesia and derealization subscales with selective attention and
divided attention did indicate an inverse relationship between these specialized forms of attention
and dissociation. This inverse relationship is consistent with the very earliest research in the field
(Freyd et al., 1998). However, the methods used in the two studies are very different, as Freyd
used emotional Stroop paradigms and measured types of error, whereas the present study used a
neutral DKEFS Color-Word Naming test and measured time and total errors in contrast with
control conditions. Additionally, no other study has analyzed selective attention in relation to the
three sub-types of dissociation or reported that only the more pathological factors, amnesia and
derealization, appear to be associated with selective attention capacity.
Like selective attention, divided attention had an inverse correlation with both amnesia
and derealization. The experimenter-designed divided attention task was totally novel in the
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literature. While it is hard to draw conclusions about a new assessment tool such as the
computerized task designed for the present study, the fact that it was significantly positively
correlated with measures of selective attention and working memory provides convergent
validity. The results in regard to divided attention are very similar to those of selective
attention—accuracy in the divided attention task was inversely correlated with the amnesia and
derealization scales of the DES.
Put together, the results of the selective and divided attention analyses indicate a much
stronger association between these specialized attentional capacities and dissociation than with
working memory. In both of these tasks, higher dissociation scores were related to poorer
performance on tests that required attention to more than one stimulus or task. It could be the
case that dissociation is linked to decreased capacity for simultaneous processing. This would
explain poorer performance on both tasks, as in the selective attention task, participants balanced
the inputs of the printed word and the actual color that the word was printed in, and in the
divided attention task, participants paid attention to both the shapes on the screen and the sound
that came from the headphones. Recent research has suggested that selective attention may be
affected by high load on frontal cognitive control processes, which increases distractor
processing (Lavie, 2005). If dissociation is an attentional problem in complex situations, and
distractibility is high in dissociators, then more complex tasks like the novel divided attention
test may elicit reduced performance in dissociators. It could also be the case that these results
indicate a reduced cognitive flexibility in dissociators, as higher degrees of dissociation were
related to worse ability to accurately process auditory and visual stimuli simultaneously. Future
studies could assess this by including the Inhibition/Switching condition of the DKEFS ColorNaming task that requires shifting between two rules while processing the color-word
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combinations. Additionally, it could be the case that shifting between modalities, such as vision
and audition in the divided attention task, is related to dissociation. Researchers can further
explore the relationship between dissociation and multimodal processing by adapting more tasks
to include visual and auditory components. It could also be the case that highly dissociative
individuals performed worse on these tasks due to the complexity of the task rules and failure to
attend to instructions. However, this seems unlikely, as the correlation between the dissociative
measures and Letter-Number Sequencing, another task with complex instructions, was nonsignificant.
Another possibility is that the association between dissociation and the attentional tasks
are somehow related to overall psychopathology. As the experiences captured by the amnesia
and derealization subscales are less common than those experiences included in the absorption
scale, perhaps the findings are a reflection of general pathology and not just dissociative
tendencies. For example, some previous research has linked dissociation to schizotypy (Knox &
Lynn, 2014), a disorder that may have cognitive implications. However, if that were the case,
we would expect other variables that have strong relationships with psychopathology, like mood
and sleep measures, to be correlated with the attentional tasks, which is not the case.
Additionally, this explanation seems unlikely as the population was not clinical and was screened
for severe trauma or use of psychoactive medications.
Combining attentional results, the data show a consistent trend of higher levels of
dissociation being related to poorer attentional abilities. This result fits most neatly with Freyd’s
betrayal trauma theory, which asserts that traumatic experiences lead to decreased selective
attentional abilities and ultimately to dissociative experiences (Freyd et al., 1998). However, all
participants in the present study explicitly denied having a history of trauma, making the
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application of Freyd’s theory inappropriate. As dissociation was not found to be positively
correlated with working memory, the data are not consistent with the construction hypothesis,
which asserts that dissociation is a product of enhanced memory encoding caused by increased
attentional and memory abilities (de Ruiter et al., 2004). Instead, our results would be most
consistent with the fantasy proneness model, which asserts that dissociation is related to
increased suggestibility and tendencies to have fantastical thoughts (Giesbrecht et al., 2008).
Based on this theory, it could be the case that individuals have background fantasy or
daydreaming cognitions at all times. Weaker divided attention and selective attention in
dissociative individuals might make them less able to successfully juggle these multiple
information-streams when processing cognitive tasks. In this case, everyone experiences some
degree of fantasy, but as people have worse attentional abilities, they are more likely to become
immersed in the fantasy and therefore display dissociative phenomena. It could also be the case
that immersing in fantasy leads people to reduce their attention to cognitive tasks, especially
those that would introduce large cognitive loads and potentially interfere with the ongoing
fantasy. While we cannot conclude any causal relationships, it is entirely possible that decreased
attention and fantasy proneness are connected.
In terms of localizing a specific brain structure associated with dissociative phenomena, it
seems that the prefrontal cortex is implicated in dissociation, as this study and others have found
significant correlations between trait dissociation and executive functions that are specific to the
prefrontal cortex, specifically the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC; Elzinga et al., 2007).
While all the cognitive functions that were correlated with dissociation seem to be subject to
prefrontal cortex control, it is impossible to draw firm conclusions about the locus of dissociative
phenomena without accompanying imaging.
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Limitations and Considerations of the Current Study
Assessment of dissociation is a significant challenge in the literature on sleep and
dissociative experiences, and in particular, the non-normal distribution of the DES total and subscale scores in non-clinical samples presents analytic challenges. This problem was addressed in
an early article by Wright and Loftus (1999) which proposed an alternative scoring approach
using “comparisons with others” as the metric for assessing dissociation instead of “what
percentage of the time.” However, none of the recent publications reporting associations
between sleep and dissociation have employed this alternate scoring method.
In the present study, there was significant positive skew in total scores and the extreme
skew in derealization scores. Previous research on sleep and DES does not report on the
normality of DES score distributions, nor does it appear to address skew with either
transformations or non-parametric approaches. For the present study, the skew of the
derealization sub-scale scores was normalized using a square root transformation. Key analyses
were also re-run with Spearman correlations, with no impact on results. Future research should
address the skew in DES scores, either by using the DES-C as proposed by Wright and Loftus, or
by employing transformations or non-parametric analytic strategies.
One purpose of the present study was to use continuous DES scores for analyses, rather
than the “extreme groups” approach often employed in the research on dissociation. Although
researchers are not explicit about the motivations for using extreme groups, one explanation may
be that analysis of variance is mistakenly perceived as relatively robust in situations where data
are skewed (Khan & Rayner, 2003). The risk of the between groups approach is that analyses
may miss curvi-linear or other complex associations between variables. As seen in Figures 3, 4
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and 5, often, the middle group actually showed the highest attentional abilities, which had not
previously noted in research and suggests the possibility of curvilinear associations.
Finally, there continue to be a variety of questions about the DES (see Stockdale, 2002;
Ruiz et al, 2008). In a recent study using advanced factor analytic techniques in a sample of
psychology students, Olsen et al. proposed a two-factor solution for the DES: absorption and a
combined amnesia/depersonalization scale (Olsen et al., 2013). Most researchers have identified
absorption as a non-pathological aspect of dissociation (Olsen et al.), but the factor structure has
varied depending on the sample surveyed and history of trauma. Olsen et al. contend that the two
factor structure has greater utility and validity across samples, and that the
amnesia/depersonalization factor is more strongly associated with pathological aspects of
dissociation. Analyses in the present study were re-run with Olsen’s proposed two factor
structure, and produced similar outcomes.
Further, when used in non-clinical samples, the DES tends to be positively skewed due to
a floor effect. Moreover, although the measure has been shown to have high convergent validity
with measures such as the SCID-D and CADSS (Condon and Lynn, 2015), as well as formal
diagnoses of dissociative disorders (Bernstein & Putnam, 1986), the components of dissociation,
such as absorption, are not well understood, especially for participants from non-clinical
samples. Additionally, this measure is entirely based on self-reports of dissociative experiences.
If in fact dissociative individuals are more suggestible and fantasy-prone, as some research
indicates (Giesbrecht et al., 2008), then the reliability of a self-report measure for dissociation
might be questionable. Before drawing conclusions based on DES results, researchers should
consider using more objective measures, such as the CADSS (Bremner et al., 1998; van
Heugten-van der Kloat et al., 2015), or interview-based approaches. Future research on
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dissociation and neurocognitive dimensions should employ both self-report and objective
measures of the phenomenon.
The sleep-related results of this study were quite surprising. Unlike many previous
studies, the relationship between ISES and DES scores was not strong, and the relationship was
non-significant when mood was controlled for statistically. While this sample of undergraduates
could be in an environment that leads them to be distinct from the general population in terms of
sleep experiences, it seems unlikely that the observed differences are due to sampling alone. It
could be the case that the ISES, which allegedly assesses atypical aspects of sleep, is instead
measuring some aspect of dissociation or psychopathology. This possibility is supported by the
fact that in the present sample, there is no significant correlation between ISES scores and the
PSQI, a well-accepted sleep measure. Convergent validity would require correlations of other
sleep measures and the ISES, but the majority of the published studies only correlate the ISES
with the DES or other measures of dissociation (Watson, 2001). In van Heugten-van de Kloat et
al., the SL50 and the ISES are correlated, but the ISES and the Stanford Sleepiness Scale under
conditions of sleep deprivation are not (2015). The SL50 contains 50 items and measures sleep
disorders and sleep complaints (Spoormaker et al., 2005). These relationships could suggest that
the ISES measures sleep disorders or sleep-wake disturbance rather than general sleep
experiences or sleepiness. Without adequate evidence of convergent validity, it is difficult to
determine what aspects of sleep, if any, the ISES measures. Although many studies are adopting
this measure as an indicator of sleep experiences in dissociation research, there is little evidence
in the published literature that the ISES assesses well-accepted aspects of sleep or the sleep-wake
cycle.
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Another important consideration is that the divided attention task was made specifically
for this study, and has not undergone extensive psychometric testing. Positive relationships with
measures of working memory and selective attention support the convergent validity of the
measure, and the measure did not correlate with sleep measures or a sustained attention measure,
which provide evidence of discriminant validity. Because some participants were confused or
couldn’t differentiate the various sounds in the auditory portion of the task, future studies should
employ pitches that are more distinguishable. Additionally, the task should include trials that
measure accuracy of identifying stimuli in each modality before presenting the stimuli
simultaneously to provide contrast information about divided attention.
The present study used a time estimate for a specific task as a proxy for dissociation, with
some success, as it was marginally correlated with the amnesia subscale of the DES and
inversely correlated with both digit span and letter-number sequencing, indicating that it was
associated with verbal working memory. As dissociation might be marked by a failure of
working memory to encode events, this time estimation task could be assessing one aspect of the
phenomena. A few previous studies have reported link between induced dissociation and time
perception (Brewin & Ma, 2012). The present study used a slightly different task by having
participants guess the duration of the test, and the task likely involved much more complex
attentional processes than just those involved in dissociation (Zakay, & Block, 1996). While this
specific task provided some insight into a connection between dissociation and memory,
researchers should strive to find more innovative, objective ways to measure dissociation.
The present study also may have been subject to order effects because with the exception
of switching the order of the CPT3 and CATA, all participants completed the items in the same
sequence. This was done in order to have participants alternate between visual and auditory
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modalities from task to task. Given the nature of these tasks, there could certainly be some
fatigue effects that impacted performance on the later tasks. Future research might vary order of
tasks to control for possible order effects.
Finally, because of the number of statistical tests run, this study may be subject to Type I
error. When appropriate, we chose multivariate analyses to reduce the number of analyses run,
but nonetheless, the possibility of Type I error remains. Given the exploratory nature of the
present study and the modest sample size, a Bonferroni correction was not used because of the
risk of a Type II error. Despite these concerns, the pattern of the results, including affect’s
mediating relationship and the inverse relationships between amnesia and derealization and
selective and divided attention, are consistent and could make meaningful contributions to the
literature. Future research should employ larger samples that would allow for statistical
corrections for Type I error.
Future Directions
Most importantly, the present study demonstrates the importance of considering mood
when exploring the connections between sleep and dissociation. While some studies have noted
that a connection exists between dissociative events and affect when manipulating sleep, a
variety of studies have reported strong associations between the ISES and DES without
controlling for mood. Based on the present study, there is some preliminary evidence that mood
may mediate the relationship between sleep and/or sleep disturbance and dissociation. This
explanation is contrary to the theories that posit that dissociation may be directly linked to sleepwake or sleep cycle disturbances (Koffel & Watson, 2009). Whether mood is assessed in terms
of clinical measures such as the BDI or BAI or more general measures such as the POMS, future
studies should consider mood when studying the sleep-dissociation link.
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Further, future research should explore trait dissociation, affect, and selective and divided
attention. In particular, replicating and extending the present study to include the InhibitionSwitching condition of the DKEFS Color-Naming task to provide information about cognitive
flexibility or other measures of divided attention would be optimal. Depending on outcomes,
results could strengthen the argument that higher levels of trait dissociation are related to a
decreased ability to attend to two tasks simultaneously, or to less cognitive flexibility. This study
was the first to explore divided attention explicitly, and the results suggest that this is a
promising area of research. Further validating the divided attention task would also strengthen
the research.
Assessment of dissociation also continues to be a challenge in the research. Studies
should to strive to use more objective measures or multi-method assessment of dissociation
instead of relying solely on the DES. The mirror gazing task used by Brewin and Ma (2012)
seems promising, and more research should be done to develop methods to induce dissociative
states and objectively measure whether an individual is experiencing dissociative phenomena.
For research continuing to explore the connection between sleep and dissociation,
attention to both measures and analyses is critical. The skewed nature of DES data, the mediating
effect of mood, and the fact that the ISES seems to capture only sleep pathology make it difficult
to make definitive statements about the relationship between dissociation and sleep. More studies
that experimentally manipulate sleep or use measures that do not rely on self-report would
provide more meaningful evidence for the existence of any relationship between sleep and
dissociation. Additionally, more research, especially in nonclinical samples, should test
curvilinear models or use methodologies that include the middle-DES group to account for the
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full spectrum of dissociative experiences. As observed in the present study, the mediumdissociators often displayed the best performance on cognitive dimensions.
Finally, research on dissociation as a construct should continue. Previous research has
generated conflicting factor solutions for the DES, and the specific components of dissociation
continue to be debated. As demonstrated by the fact that the amnesia and derealization subscales
correlated with cognitive measures, but absorption did not, the DES may capture two related but
distinct constructs. Because the nature of the absorption items is so qualitatively different from
the amnesia and derealization items, and because the two seem to have different relationships
with cognition, it seems possible that this measure is assessing at least two dimensions, as Olsen
et al. (2013) suggest.
Finally, the question whether or not parametric approaches are appropriate seems an
important one in studying dissociation. The observed positive skew and floor effects for the
amnesia and derealization subscales suggest that non-parametric analyses might be more
appropriate for non-clinical samples. It is surprising that more studies do not employ nonparametric tests or transformational strategies when analyzing DES scores. In sum, researchers
should carefully consider appropriate measures and analyses when they are approaching
pathological dissociation or absorption phenomena.
In conclusion, the present study provides support for an inverse relationship between
dissociation and selective and divided attention tasks. While recent sleep research offers a
tempting theoretical connection between dissociation and cognition, the mediating effect of
mood must be considered and addressed. Finally, the challenges of defining and measuring
dissociation suggest that the construct of dissociation continues to need attention, including the
possibility of a two-factor solution for the DES that distinguishes pathological symptoms from
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absorption. This distinction could provide a more consistent framework for approaching these
experiences and better enable researchers to explore all the aspects of dissociation.
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Tables
Table 1. Gender means and standard deviations and grand means and standard deviations
for dissociative, sleep and neurocognitive measures.
DES Total
DES absorption
DES amnesia
DES derealization
ISES general
PSQI total
Hours of sleep
WRAT scaled*
Digit Span
Spatial Span
Letter Number Sequencing
Color-Word Time
Color-Word Errors
Divided Attention Acc.
CPT Block Change
CATA Block Change
POMS TMD
Time estimate error

Male (26)r
14.14 (9.16)
24.02 (15.58)
7.26 (7.83)
4.94 (8.08)
2.76 (0.90)
5.35 (2.92)
6.894 (1.16)
115.27 (8.46)
10.69 (3.32)
11.81 (2.43)
11.27 (3.37)
10.38 (1.72)
10.96 (2.39)
83.40 (14.64)
47.92 (8.94)
50.24 (12.15)
-0.16 (0.91)
-1.07 (6.00)

Female (50)t
15.73 (11.29)
26.20 (18.40)
8.03 (9.06)
6.10 (9.72)
2.95 (0.93)
5.94 (3.16)
7.041 (1.11)
110.58 (9.19)
10.68 (2.71)
12.56 (2.00)
11.88 (2.66)
10.66 (1.77)
10.28 (2.89)
85.32 (9.32)
50.24 (7.03)
50.88 (9.44)
-0.12 (0.98)
-2.94 (5.72)

Grand Mean (75)t
15.18 (10.58)
25.45 (17.41)
7.76 (8.62)
5.70 (9.15)
2.88 (0.92)
5.74 (3.07)
6.99 (1.12)
112.18 (9.17)
10.68 (2.91)
12.30 (2.17)
11.67 (2.91)
10.57 (1.75)
10.51 (2.73)
84.65 (11.39)
49.45 (7.76)
50.67 (10.34)
-0.13 (.95)
-2.29 (5.85)

*p<.05
t= Sample size for females in the ISES, Divided attention measures, and time estimate were all
49. Total sample size for the same measures was 75.
r= one male participant’s results on the CATA provided no HRT score.
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Table 2. Pearson correlations and p values for DES derealization and DES transformed with
neurogcognitive measures. (N = 76)
Measure
DES dereal
DES dereal sqrt
r
p
r
p
.71
.00
.73
.00
DES TOTAL
.51
.00
.56
.00
DES ABS
.51
.00
.50
.00
DES AMN
.26
.03
.33
.00
ISES GEN
.13
.27
.18
.13
PSQI TOTAL
-.15
.20
-.09
.45
Digit Span total
-.03
.80
-.03
.77
Spatial Span total
-.11
-.35
-.09
.44
Letter Number Seq
-.14
.25
-.13
.26
Color-Word time
-.25
.03
-.23
.05
Color-Word errors
.13
.28
.05
.70
Time Estimate error
-.32
.01
-.27
.02
Div Att Accuracy
.18
.13
.20
.09
CPT d
.08
.49
.10
.41
CPT HRT Change
.01
.90
-.05
.70
CATA d
-.05
.70
-.02
.84
CATA HRT Change
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Table 3. Items below the axis represent the summary of correlations for DES, POMS TMD, ISES
general subscale, PSQI, and WRAT. Items above the axis represent the correlations for DES,
ISES general subscale, and WRAT when controlling for POMS. (N=76)
Measure
DES Total
POMS TMD ISES Gen.
PSQI
WRAT
-----------

DES Total

.19

.02

-.17

-----------

-----------

-----------

.01

-.10

POMS
TMD

-.41t

ISES Gen.

.24*

-.17

PSQI

.21o

-.45t

.08

WRAT

-.19o

.13

-.11

o

p<=.10, * p<=.05, t p<=.01

-.11
-.16

Formatted Table
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1.

-----

2.

.93t

-----

3.

.76t

.57t

-----

4.

.73t

.56t

.50t

-----

5.

.24*

.18

.11

.33t

-----

6.

.21o

.25*

.11

.18

.08

-----

7.

-.18

-.18

-.15

-.09

.09

-.05

-----

8.

.01

.01

-.05

-.03

-.01

-.18

.24*

-----

9.

-.10

-.10

-.11

-.09

.00

-.11

.63t

.35t

-----

10.

-.06

-.15

-.23*

-.13

.01

.05

.07

.29*

.17

-----

11.

-.19o

-.10

-.23*

-.23*

-.01

.16

.14

.11

.12

.39t

-----

12.

.19

.16

.22o

.05

-.13

-.07

-.26*

-.22o

.09

.01

-.10

-----

13.

-.13

.02

-.26*

-.27*

-.08

.32t

.22o

.13

.33t

.24*

.24*

.21o

-----

14.

.08

.03

.08

.20o

.13

.10

-.04

-.17

-.10

-.22o

-.16

.00

-.23*

-----

15.

.17

.18

.19

.10

.25*

-.05

-.09

.01

-.15

.15

.02

.08

-.04

.01

-----

16.

.13

.12

.21o

-.05

.05

.05

-.08

-.12

-.16

.02

-.13

.23*

-.02

.30t

.04

-----

17.

-.03

.00

.02

-.02

.02

-.19

-.01

-.02

.00

.13

.13

.04

.13

-.03

.32t

-.03

o

p<=.10, * p<=.05, t p<=.01

17. CATA HRT
change

16. CATA d

15. CPT HRT
change

14. CPT d

13. Divided
attention

12. Time estimate
error

11. Color-Word
errors

10. Color-Word
time

9. Letter Number
Seq.

8. Spatial Span

7. Digit Span

6. PSQI

5. ISES

4. DES dereal (sq)

3. DES amnesia

2. DES abs

1.DES Total

Measure

Table 4. Summary of correlations of DES total and subscales with sleep and neurocognitive
variables. (N=76; 75 for ISES, Time estimate, Divided Attention, and CATA HRT Change)

-----
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Table 5. Summary of correlations of dissociative, and working memory measures. (N=76)
Measure
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
----1. DES Total
----.93t
2. DES abs
t
.76
.57t
----3. DES amn
t
.56t
.50t
----.73
4. DES dereal
-.18
-.18
-.15
-.09
----5. Digit span
.01
.01
-.05
-.03
.24*
----6. Spatial span
-.10
-.11
-.09
.63t
.35t
----7. Letter number -.10
o
t
p<=.10, * p<=.05, p<=.01
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Table 6. ANOVA of working memory measures by split groups of DES (0-9.99, 10-19.99, 2050).
Low DES
Med DES
High DES
F
p
(29)
(29)
(18)
10.59 (2.13) 11.76 (2.10) 9.83 (1.82)
5.30
.01
Digit Span F
7.62 (2.62)
7.93 (2.42)
6.67 (2.25)
1.51
.23
Digit Span B
9.93 (1.75) 10.21 (1.72) 9.56 (1.20)
0.89
.41
Spatial Span F
9.76 (1.84)
9.45 (1.57)
9.56 (1.38)
0.27
.77
Spatial Span B
11.48 (2.82) 12.38 (3.04) 10.83 (2.73)
1.69
.19
Letter Number

84
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Table 7. Summary of correlations of dissociative and selective attention measures. (N=76)
Measure
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1. DES Total
2. DES abs
3. DES amn
4. DES dereal
5. Color-Word time contrast
6. Color-word error contrast
o
p<=.1, * p <.05, t p<.01

--.93t
.76t
.73t
-.06
-.19o

--.57t
.56t
-.15
-.10

--.50t
-.23*
-.23*

---.13
-.23*

.39t

---
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Table 8. ANOVA of selective attention measures by split groups of DES (0-9.99, 10-19.99, 2050)
Low DES
Med DES
High DES
F
p
(29)
(29)
(18)
10.62 (2.53)
10.93 (2.53)
9.67 (3.27)
1.24
.30
Scaled Inhibition
10.90 (1.84)
10.52 (1.68)
10.11 (1.68)
1.15
.32
Scaled contrast
11.45 (2.29)
12.14 (1.90)
11.00 (2.17)
1.73
.19
Errors scaled
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Table 9. Summary of correlations of dissociative and divided attention measures. (N=76 for DES
measures, 75 for Divided attention measures).
Measure
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
----1. DES Total
.93t
2. DES abs
.76t
3. DES amn
.73t
4. DES dereal
-.13
5. DIV ATT acc.
.04
6. DIV ATT r.t.
o
p<=.10, * p<=.05, t p<=.01

----.57t
.56t
.02
.12

----.50t
-.26*
.06

-----.27*
-.11

-----.10

-----
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Table 10. ANOVA analysis of divided attention measures by split groups of DES (0-9.99, 1019.99, 20-50)
Low DES (29) Med DES (28) High DES (18)
F
p
86.22 (9.44)
84.64 (12.96)
82.13 (11.39)
0.71
.49
DIV ATT ACC
2.12 (0.61)
1.88 (0.51)
2.34 (0.72)
2.44
.09
DIV ATT R.T.
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Table 11. Summary of correlations of dissociative and sustained attention measures.(N=76 for
DES measures, 75 for Sustained attention measures).
Measure
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
----1. DES Total
.93t
2. DES abs
.76t
3. DES amn
.73t
4. DES dereal
.08
5. CPT detectability
.17
6. CPT HRT change
7. CATA detectability .13
8. CATA HRT change -.03
o
p<=.10, * p<=.05, t p<=.01

----.57t
.56t
.03
.18
.12
.00

----.50t
.08
.19
.21o
.02

----.20o
.10
-.05
-.02

----.25* ----.30t -.03 -----.03 .32t -.03 -----
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Table 12. Select Pearson correlations of total dissociation and subscales with neurocognitive
measures followed by Pearson correlation when controlling for affect as measured by POMS
TMD in parentheses. (N=76; 75 for ISES, Time estimate, Divided Attention, and CATA HRT
Change).
Measure
DES Total

DES abs

DES amn

DES dereal (sqrt)

-----

DES absorption

.93t (.93t)

-----

DES amnesia

.76t (.73t)

.51t (.57t)

-----

DES dereal (sqrt)

.73t (.68t)

.48t (.56t)

.50t (.44t)

-----

Digit Span

-.18 (-.17)

-.18 (-.18)

-.15 (-.14)

-.09 (-.07)

.01 (.01)

.01 (.01)

-.05 (-.03)

-.03 (-.04)

Letter Number Seq.

-.10 (-.11)

-.11 (-.10)

-.11 (-.11)

-.09 (-.10)

Color-Word time

-.06 (-.22o)

-.16 (-.15)

-.23* (-.27*)

-.13 (-.15)

Color-Word errors

-.19o (-.23*)

-.13 (-.10)

-.23* (-.27*)

-.23* (-.26*)

Time estimate error

.19 (.17)

.13 (.16)

.22o (.20o)

.05 (.02)

-.13 (-.17)

.00 (.02)

-.26* (-.32t)

-.27* (-.32t)

CPT d

.08 (.04)

-.01 (.03)

.08 (.06)

.20o (.18)

CPT HRT change

.17 (.10)

.18 (.10)

.19 (.14)

.10 (.02)

CATA d

.13 (.06)

.05 (.12)

.21o (.13)

-.05 (-.13)

-.03 (-.09)

.00 (-.06)

.02 (-.02)

-.02 (-.08)

Spatial Span

Divided Attention

CATA HRT change
o

DES Total

p<=.10, * p<=.05, t p<=.01
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Figures
Figure 1. Scatterplot and fit line of affect scores (POMS TMDotal) vs. trait dissociation scores
(DES) for 76 undergraduate students. .
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Figure 2. Scatterplot and fit line of trait dissociation (DES Total) and sleep experience (ISES
General) for 75 undergraduate students.
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Figure 3. Means and standard deviations for individuals scoring as low
low-,, medium-,
medium and highdissociators for working memory as measured by digit span forward (a), digit span backward (b),
spatial span forward (c), spatial span backward (d), and letter
letter-number
number sequencing (e).
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Figure 4. Means and standard deviation for individuals scoring in the low, medium, and high
range of DES on selective attention as measured by the DCKEFS color-word
word task scores on
scaled inhibition (a), scaled inhibition contrast (b), and contrast errors (c).
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Figure 5. Means and standard deviations for individuals scoring in the low, medium, and high
range of DES on divided attention as measured by the divided attention task variables of
accuracy (a) and reaction time (b).
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Figure 6. Means and standard deviations for individuals scoring in the low, medium, and high
range of DES on sustained attention as measured by scores of CPT detectability (a), CPT HRT
Block Change (b), CATA detectability (c), and CATA HRT Block Change (d).
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Appendix A: Demographic Information
Please do not write your name on this form. It will be stored separately from any other
information that you complete during this study. The information will allow the researchers to
provide an accurate description of the sample.

DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION
What is your date of birth?
What is your age in years?
What is your sex/gender?
What is your race/ethnicity?
What is your year in college?
How many years of school have you had in total (did you ever skip or repeat a grade?)
Is English your first language?
Are you right-handed?

Health Information
Have you ever been treated with a psychoactivative medication such as anti-anxiety or antidepressants?
If yes, are you currently taking these?
If not currently, approximately when in your life were you taking this medication?
Have you ever been diagnosed with a neurological or psychiatric condition or a learning disorder? (If yes,
please list)

Do you have normal color vision?
Have you ever experienced a severely traumatic event where you feared for your life?
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Appendix C: Dissociative Experiences Scale-Version II
This questionnaire consists of twenty-eight questions about experiences that you may
have in your daily life. We are interested in how often you have these experiences. It is
important, however, that your answers show how often these experiences happen to you when
you are not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. To answer the questions, please determine
to what degree the experience described in the question applies to you and circle the number to
show what percentage of the time you have the experience.
Example:

0%
10
(Never)

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100%
(Always)

1. Some people have the experience of driving or riding in a car or bus or subway and suddenly
realizing that they don’t remember what has happened during all or part of the trip. Circle a
number to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100%

2. Some people find that sometimes they are listening to someone talk and they suddenly realize
that they did not hear part or all of what was just said. Circle a number to show what percentage
of the time this happens to you.
0%

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100%

3. Some people have the experience of finding themselves in a place and having no idea how
they got there. Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100%

4. Some people have the experience of finding themselves dressed in clothes that they don’t
remember putting on. Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100%

5. Some people have the experience of finding new things among their belonging that they do
not remember buying. Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100%

6. Some people find that they are approached by people that they do not know who call them by
another name or insist that they have met them before. Circle a number to show what percentage
of the time this happens to you.
0%

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100%
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7. Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling as though they are standing next to
themselves or watching themselves do something and they actually see themselves as if they
were looking at another person. Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this
happens to you.
0%

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100%

8. Some people are told that they sometimes do not recognize friends or family members. Circle
a number to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100%

9. Some people find that they have no memory for some important events in their lives (for
example, a wedding or graduation). Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this
happens to you.
0%

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100%

10. Some people have the experience of being accused of lying when they do not think that they
have lied. Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100%

11. Some people have the experience of looking in a mirror and not recognizing themselves.
Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
0%

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100%

12. Some people have the experience of feeling that other people, objects, and the world around
them are not real. Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
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13. Some people sometimes have the experience of feeling that their body does not seem to
belong to them. Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
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14. Some people have the experience of sometimes remembering a past event so vividly that they
feel as if they were reliving the event. Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this
happens to you.
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15. Some people have the experience of not being sure whether things that they remember
happening really did happen or whether they just dreamed them. Circle a number to show what
percentage of the time this happens to you.
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16. Some people have the experience of being in a familiar place but finding it strange and
unfamiliar. Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
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17. Some people sometimes find that when they are watching television or a movie they become
so absorbed in the story that they are unaware of other events happening around them. Circle a
number to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
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18. Some people sometimes find that they become so involved in a fantasy or daydream that it
feels as though it were really happening to them. Circle a number to show what percentage of the
time this happens to you.
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19. Some people find that they sometimes are able to ignore pain. Circle a number to show what
percentage of the time this happens to you.
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20. Some people find that they sometimes sit staring off into space, thinking of nothing, and are
not aware of the passage of time. Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this
happens to you.
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21. Some people sometimes find that when they are alone they talk out loud to themselves.
Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
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22. Some people find that in one situation they may act so differently compared with another
situation that they feel almost as if they were two different people. Circle a number to show what
percentage of the time this happens to you.
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23. Some people sometimes find that in certain situations they are able to do things with amazing
ease and spontaneity that would usually be difficult for them (for example, sports, work, social
situations, etc.). Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
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24. Some people sometimes find that they cannot remember whether they have done something
or have just thought about doing that thing (for example, not knowing whether they have mailed
a letter or have just thought about mailing it). Circle a number to show what percentage of the
time this happens to you.
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25. Some people find evidence that they have done things they do not remember doing. Circle a
number to show what percentage of the time this happens to you.
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26. Some people sometimes find writings, drawing, or notes among their belonging that they
must have done but cannot remember doing. Circle a number to show what percentage of the
time this happens to you.
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27. Some people sometimes find that they hear voices inside their head that tell them to do things
or comment on things that they are doing. Circle a number to show what percentage of the time
this happens to you.
0%

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100%

28. Some people sometimes feel as if they are looking at the world through a fog so that people
and objects appear far away or unclear. Circle a number to show what percentage of the time this
happens to you.
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Appendix D: Iowa Sleep Experiences Scale
Directions. Indicate how often you experience each of the following statements by writing the
number that corresponds to your choice on this line next to each item.
----------------------------------------------------1 = never
2 = less than once a year
3= once or twice a year
4 = several times a year
5 = once or twice a month
6 = several times a month
7= several times a week
----------------------------------------------------_________

1. Upon awakening during the night, I am unsure whether I actually
experiences something or only dreamed about it.

_________

2. Lying in bed, I sense the presence of someone who actually isn’t there.

_________

3. I experience intense, dreamlike images as I begin to fall asleep.

_________

4. I experience intense, dreamlike images as I begin to awaken.

_________

5. While awake, I experience a sudden weakness in my body muscles during
states of strong emotion such as anger or excitement.

_________

6. I remember my dreams.

_________

7. I have a dream that is so vivid it influences how I feel the following day.

_________

8. I have nightmares.

_________

9. I have dreamed that I was falling.

_________

10. I have dreamed that I was flying.

_________

11. I have dreamed that I woke up (that is, waking up was part of the dream
experience).

_________

12. I have recurring dreams.

_________

13. I have dreamed about something that later actually happened.

_________

14. I have died in a dream.

_________

15. A dream helped me to solve a current problem or concern.

_________

16. I am aware that I am dreaming, even as I dream.

_________

17. I am able to control or direct the content of my dreams.

_________

18. I am able to wake myself out of dreams that I find unpleasant or
disturbing.
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Appendix E: Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index
Instructions: The following questions relate to your usual sleep habits during the past month only. Your answers
should indicate the most accurate reply for the majority of days and nights in the past month. Please answer all
questions.
During the past month,
1. When have you usually gone to bed? ______________
2. How long (in minutes) has it taken you to fall asleep each night? _______________
3. When have you usually gotten up in the morning? ______________
4. How many hours of actual sleep do you get at night? (This may be different than the number of hours you
spend in bed) ________________
5. During the past month, how often have you had trouble sleeping
because you…

Not during
the past
month (0)

Less than
once a
week (1)

Once or
twice a
week (2)

Three or
more times
a week (3)

Very good
(0)

Fairly
good (1)

Fairly bad
(2)

Very bad
(3)

a. Cannot get to sleep within 30 minutes
b. Wake up in the middle of the night or early morning
c. Have to get up to use the bathroom
d. Cannot breathe comfortably
e. Cough or snore loudly
f. Feel too cold
g. Feel too hot
h. Have bad dreams
i. Have pain
j. Other reason(s), please describe, including how often
you have had trouble sleeping because of this reason(s)
6. During the past month, how often have you taken medicine
(prescribed or “over the counter”) to help you sleep?
7. During the past month, how often have you had trouble staying
awake while driving, eating meals, or engaging in social activity?
8. During the past month, how much of a problem has it been for you
to keep up enthusiasm to get things done?

9. During the last month, how would you rate your sleep quality
overall?
Component 1
Component 2
Component 3
Component 4
Component 5
Component 6
Component 7

#9 Score
#2 Score (<=15=0,16-30=1, 31-60 min=2, >60 min=3)+5a score
(if sum is equal 0=0, 1-2=1, 3-4=2, 5-6=3)
#4 Score (>7=0, 6-7=1, 5-6=2,<5=3)
(total # of hours asleep)/(total # of hours in bed) x 100
Sum of scores #5b to #5j (0=0; 1-9=1; 10-18=2; 19-27=3)
#6 score
#7 score + #8 score (0=0; 1-2=1; 3-4=2; 5-6=3)

C1 _____
C2 _____
C3 _____
C4 _____
C5 _____
C6 _____
C7 _____

Add the seven component scores together _____Global PSQI Score _____
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Appendix F: Time Estimate
Please estimate the duration of the task you just completed at the computer beginning with the
first trial after the practice and ending with the completion of the test.

____________ minutes and

